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PART1. CONTEXTS, CHRONOLOGIES AND QUESTIONS 
Large historical problems are stimuiating to debate but diffícult to 
sp)ecify and answer in ways that might carry forward our long-standing 
discourses in global economic history. The papers which form the basis 
of our essay dea! with a meta question and are focused upen the economic 
consequences (the costs and benefits) for those European societies most 
actively involved in territorial expansión, colonization, world trade, capital 
exports and emigration to other continents over the past five centuries. 
Our symbolic dates mark (rather than demárcate) the beginning and ending 
of European imperialism. Colonisation occurred in Antiquity and in the 
Middle Ages but between 1415 and 1789 European powers, particularly 
Britain but also Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and Italy, founded 
hundreds of colonies. Individual articles have concentrated upon periods 
of significance for particular countries and are, moreover, analysed within 
the context of an intemational economy, evolving through four eras 
(or orders) of mercantilism (1415-1846), liberalism (1846-1914), 
neo-mercantilism (1914-48), and decolonisation (1948-74). Our 
Introduction draws heavily upon six national case studies as well as 
discussions that took place at a conference in Madrid in 1997. We do 
not intend to cite particular contributions to the inferences and conclusions 
in this essay. Our views represent an elaboration upon and an interpretation 
of the articles that follow. They are not a survey (still less a synthesis) 
and the scholars who participated with us in this intellectual venture would 
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not necessarily agree with all the generalisations we have attempted to 
draw from their work '. 
In short, we have simply relied upon 11 authors, who have tried to 
elucídate outcomes for the long term development of the major metropolitan 
economies of Western Europe. When, how, where and why did European 
societies (and Europe as a whole) gain or lose economically from political 
connexions established and maintaincd (in stronger or looser forms) with 
national Empires are the difficult questions confronted by this complex 
and wide ranging exercise in European and comparative economic history. 
To confine a discussion that is potentially timeless and global in scope 
we refrained from widening it geographically, from lengthening it 
chronologically and left consideration of the impact of European 
imperialism on the economies and peoples of other continents for future 
consideration. 
Comparative history goes back to the Enlightenment and is exemplified 
in the writings of a line of distinguished scholars (including Montesquieu, 
Voltaire, Tocqueville, Weber, SchmoUer, Bloch, Braudel, Gerschenkron, 
McNeill, Wallerstein, Landes and others). All history that wishes to depart 
from cataloguing, describing and narrating and seeks to move on towards 
explanation must become comparative. Comparative history tries to impose 
order; to escape from the complexity, diversity and the tyranny of national 
detail and persuade us that it can offer coherent but sensitive interpretations 
of the grand themes that historians select for discussion. That design tends 
to be realised when scholars concéntrate upon quantified outcomes, 
emanating from well researched locations which exhibit comparable but, 
more important, dissimilar economic, geographical, political, social, cultural 
and other conditions. Then as Marc Bloch anticipated «the comparative 
method can elicit from the chaotic multiplicity of circumstances those which 
were generally effective». Bloch also observed that «correctly understand 
the primary interest of the comparative method is ... the observation of 
differences» .^ Thus for this theme, the method was brought to bear upon 
a sample of national economies, within which large scale investment in 
and persistent involvement with empire (and with the legacy of empire) 
varied in entirely different ways across space and through time. 
' Their papers were elaboratcd for Session Al , Twelfth International Economic History 
Congress, Seville, 24-28 August 1998 and will be prcscnted to the Congress by two 
rapporteurs, David Landes and Immanuel Wallerstein. 
^ Bloch (1925) pp. 15-25. 
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Furthermore, few authors approached, or indeed could deal with, the 
problem without some theory or conceptual categories in mind. Thus all 
of the nationwide case studies published here made use of the standard 
balance of payments taxonomy as well as vocabularies and models derived 
from intemational economics in order to assess the overall economic impact 
of interconnexions with empires on the long run development of 
metropoiitan economies. Exports and imports, emigration and capital flows 
between national economies and their overseas possessions, remained 
central for analysis even though data, particularly for eras before the 
midnineteenth century, tumed out to be hard to find. Terms and conditions 
for trade set within a framework of imperial rules and regulations (designed 
to favour the home economy) have been evaluated; as well as the relative 
costs for defence borne by metropoiitan and colonial economies. 
Furthermore, imperial policies continued to be interrelated with a whole 
range of foreign, strategic and domestic policies pursed by European states 
right up to (and even beyond) the post-war era of decolonisation. In all 
kinds of direct and less obvious ways, a nation's involvement with its own 
(and with other nations') empires fed into the making of fiscal and monetary 
policies, the legal frameworks surrounding national commodity, capital and 
labour markets and also into attitudes and behavioural patterns 
underpinning various styles of capitalism that developed across Europe. 
Imperial, foreign and metropoiitan influences upon the policies, institutions 
and cultures which promoted or restrained economic development tumed 
out to be difficult to sepárate out and even more problematical to weigh. 
That is why the inclusión of an economy (like Italy) with a history of limited 
involvement either with its own possessions overseas or with other empires 
seems heuristic to contémplate. While a paper from Colin White on the 
making and maintenance of the Romanov Empire (to represent the case 
of colonisation overland), and which we discussed at the Madrid 
Conference, was likewise instructive to contrast with more familiar cases 
of European expansión overseas .^ 
As usual counterfactual assumptions are revealed as implicit in any 
attempt to model and to measure the costs and benefits of macro economic 
strategies. Most authors wisely eschewed any systematic pursuit of 
counterfactual history. They reluctantly recognised that what might have 
happened to a nation's economic growth, with more constrained recourse 
to empire by way of an earlier delinking from colonial exploitation (often 
' White (1997). 
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maturing into costly responsibilities) are simply assumptions behind the 
questions raised. Economists might well decry the absence of explicit 
modelling and \vill undoubtedly recommend a black box labelled dynamic 
equilibrium theory to historians trying to cope with problems of this kind. 
Nevertheless, the one «big thing» that has emerged from this collaborative 
exercise is that the significance of empires for national economic 
development varied in üluminating ways across space and through time. 
We failed to find a high resolution map to carry us through the complex 
landscapes of imperial history. Economic historians worry about facts, 
chronology and contextúa! integrity. As the papers expose, they remain 
committed to detail, lo locality and to contingency. Some even revel in 
paradox and ambiguity and seem more inclined to destroy than deploy 
grand theory. They have evaded counterfactual analysis that, alas, for this 
meta question cannot be specified in ways that could possibly command 
consensus among historians, increasingly impressed with the admission of 
chaos theory even into natural let alone the social sciences. 
All history is contemporary history and the current interest in 
imperialism originates in three large issues that preoccupy European and 
North American political leaders in the late twentieth century. First and 
foremost is a deepening anxiety about the shift in strategic and economic 
power away from Europe and North America towards Asia. Secondly, the 
problem of world poverty and relative deprivation, analysed by economists 
and sociologists since mid century, has also attracted sustained attention 
from economic historians and historical sociologists. Their concems with 
the origins of the so called North-South divide have led to plausible 
observations about long term trends in levéis of income per capita achieved 
by European populations compared to the majority of humanity subsisting 
as citizens of Third World societies that form part of the continents of 
África, Asia and Southern America. From the poor data at their disposal, 
Paul Bairoch, Angus Maddison and other manufacturers of historical 
statistics, conjecture that European (including North American and 
Australian) standards of living were perhaps already twice as high as average 
levéis achieved by the rest of the world in the eighteenth century .^ 
Thereafter differentials widened to reach 4:1 by 1900, 5:1 by 1950 and 
today the gap in per capita incomes between Western Europeans and the 
inhabitants of the Third World is probably in the order of 10:1 and seems 
•" Maddison's conjectures about the gaps differs from Bairoch's. Maddison (1983) 
pp. 27-41. 
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set to diverge even further in future'. Thirdly, and flowing from 
improvement in networks of transpon and Communications, the world 
economy has now become integrated and interdependent. National, 
regional and local economies are components of a global economy. Their 
growth and fluctuations depend to an ever more discemable degree upon 
the operation of markets for commodities, services, labour, capital and 
technology that transcend national frontiers. Major actors in these markets 
consist of large-scale multinational corporations whose activities in 
production, trade, finance and the transfer of technology are 
transcontinental in scope .^ 
Contemporary concerns with the waning of European and American 
hegemony, with the maldistribution of income among countries and with 
the «globalisation» of national economies has prompted intellectuals to 
look back into the origins and developments through time of features of 
the world economy, particularly imperialism, that command widespread 
attention and analysis at the end of the millennium. One famous school 
of global historians, who moved early into the research and reflexión 
required to deal with such large questions, has effectively set the agenda 
for discourse in the field. According to their leading spokesman: «Neither 
the development ñor underdevelopment of any specifíc territorial unit can 
be analysed or interpreted without fitting it into the cyclical rhythms and 
secular trends of the world economy as a whole» .^ World systems history 
and theory continué to develop and rest upon this premise. Nevertheless, 
there is an unresolved debate about just when and how significant 
connexions, through trade, migration and capital flows across frontiers and 
oceans, might have been for the development of national and regional 
economies before the diffusion of railways, steamships, telegraphs and the 
liberal intemational order that appeared after 1846. According to André 
Gunder-Frank and Barry Gills intemational connexions mattered for 
millennia before that time .^ In her famous study Janet Abu-Lughod traces 
the origins of «The World System» to the century 1250-1350'. Jerry 
Bentley and Philip Curtin find «cross cultural contacts and exchanges» 
even further back in time '°. Immanuel Wallerstein and his school insist 
Bairoch and Levy Leboycr (1981). 
Hirst and Thompson (1996). 
Wallerstein(1979). p. 73. 
Gunder-Frank and Gills (1993). 
Abu-Lughod (1989). 
" Bentley (1993) and Curtin (1984). 
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that three centuries after 1450 witnessed the emergence and consolidation 
of a «European world economy based upon the capitalist mode of 
production» " . James Blaut's acclaimed Colonizers Model of the World 
represcnts the voyage of Columbus to the New World as the point of 
discontinuity. «Prior to 1492», he observes, «progress towards 
modemisation and capitalism which was taking place in Asia and África 
as well as Europe». Blaut goes on to assert that «this hemisphere wide 
system began to break apart shortly after 1492 because of the wealth and 
power acquired by Europeans in America... The massive flow of wealth 
into Europe from colonial accumulation in America and later in Asia and 
África was the one basic forcé that explains the fact that Europe became 
transformed rapidly into a capitalist society and the complementary fact 
that Asian and África proto capitalist centres began to decline first in relative 
and then in absolute importance». Blaut recognised, however, that: «many 
processes internal to Europe were important causes of change, of 
developmcnt in that continent but the one basic process that continuously 
fuelled the transformation was the wealth from colonisation» '^. 
Over the past three decades, books and articles published by the world 
systems schools of historical sociology and economic history and their critics 
have commendably and successfully shifted the «Eurocentric» focus of both 
Marxist and non-Marxist concerns with the origins and nature of 
imperialism towards questions about long term development and of 
underdevelopment. Simplifications and distortions occur in «boxing» 
scholars together in «schools». Obviously there are saüent differences in 
the treatment, coverage and emphasis from one author to another in the 
precise importance imputed to connexions between a country's 
international economic relations and its long term growth. Nevertheless, 
and for purposes of contextualising the six national case studies included 
in this volume, we propose to paraphrase a general argument that 
commands widespread assent among intellectuals from the Third World. 
According to this well elaborated view, the economic advance of 
Western Europe and the contingent retardation of Asia, África, Latin 
America and Eastern Europe originated and evolved over the centuries 
from the capture of Ceuta in 1415 to the repeal of the Corn laws in 1846, 
when Europeans (the «core») manipulated the conditions and therefore 
turned the terms of trade in their favour and exploited the rest of the 
Wallerstein(1974), p. 67. 
Blaut (1993),pp. 152-3. 
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world. Through superior miÜtary technology and advanced forms of political 
and business organisation, Western Europeans either plundered and 
colonised the resources of other continents or reduced the weaker 
economies of Eastern Europe (the so-called semi-periphery) to conditions 
of dependency. Once established on a sustainable basis, intercontinental 
commerce dominated by Europeans promoted forms of labour control 
(such as slavery and peonage at the periphery and serfdom and 
sharecropping at the semi-periphery) which maintained pnces of cxports 
from the Third World sold on European markets cióse to subsistence wage 
costs. 
During centuries before (and even after) the advent of free trade in 
1846, institutions, property rights and modes of conducting trade emerged 
to control the marketing of minerals and primary produce and to set highly 
unequal terms under which surpluses from the Third World were exchanged 
for the manufactured goods, températe farm produce and commercial 
Services sold by European merchants. Over time the imposed institutions 
of a European mercantilist and imperialistic economic order created 
patterns of specialisation and sustained terms of trade which placed (and 
in some cases propelled) the economies of Western Europe on paths leading 
to industrialisation and higher standards of living and demoted the 
economies of the periphery (and semi-periphery) towards primary 
production, monoculture and to slower rates of growth in per capita 
incomes " . 
Our papers confront these arguments with case studies which seek 
to analyse a relevant range of connexions between Europe's national 
economies and their colonies and dependencies (i.e. their imperial systems) 
overseas. Alas their delimited concerns might seem «repressively 
occidental» because they do not deal with the origins of European 
imperialism and pay almost no attention to Europe's impact (negative and 
positive) upon the territories, resources and indigenous populations of Asia, 
África and the Americas '^. They are confíned to an analysis of the costs 
and benefits from empires in terms of long run macro-economic outcomes 
for a small sample of now affluent European industrial market economies. 
They also concéntrate on connexions between European investment 
in empire and commerce with other continents over some five centuries 
of time and as usual the chronologies and long cycles used for periodisation 
" 0'Brien{1997). 
" Bairoch(1993). 
35 
PATRICK KARL OBRIEN AND LEANDRO PRADOS DE l A ESCOSURA 
raised a plethora of problems. Discontinuities and conjunctures varied from 
case to case. Nevertheless, most authors recognised that the French 
Revolution and Revolutionary Wars and their immediate aftermath, 
1789-1825, marked a tuming point in die centuries cid struggle among 
European powers for dominance in global commerce and the acquisition 
of possessions and assets overseas. After that juncture (and even during 
«the high tide» of imperialism, 1882-1903), warfare among European 
powers, fought to secure resources and monopolies of trade with other 
continents, subsided towards the diplomacy of peaceable settlements and 
carve-ups. In the wake of the French Revolution, several nations (France, 
Spain, Portugal and Holland) lost serious amounts of territory overseas 
as well as the power to control the extemal economic relations of former 
colonies and dependencies in África, Asia and the Americas. For decades 
their interest in and benefits previously obtained from Empire diminished 
and in some cases decreased sharply. For these reasons European imperial 
history divides for heuristic purposes into two epochs: namely the centuries 
before and after a conjuncture precipitated by the French Revolution; and 
into four periods: the centuries from the capture of Ceuta in 1415 to 
the inauguration of free trade, 1846, labelled as a mercantilist order; the 
period from 1846 to the Great War called liberalism; the years between 
the wars, 1914-48, depicted as neo-mercantilism; and modem times, 
1948-1974, representad as a period of decolonisation. 
The focus of the papers is macro. They explore linkages to the economic 
development of entire nations and to their «industrialisation» rather than 
to the accumulation of wealth by towns, churches, conquistadors, 
merchants, soldiers, sailors and aristocrats who made fortunes from 
imperialism. By the first half of the nineteenth century modem, urban, 
industrial market economies of the kind that fortúnate Europeans inhábil 
today had already appeared on the continent. Even before that time political 
economists had analysed the connexions between the affluent cities, 
advanced regions and developing countries of Western Europe on the one 
hand and their commitments to oceanic trade, maritime outposts and 
colonial possessions overseas on the other. Responding to the recent 
stimulus offered by the hypotheses of the World Systems School, it surely 
is time to respecify questions that are venerable and to go over the 
arguments again. What were these connexions? What mechanisms 
emanating from trade and empire promoted the long run development 
of Western Europe? Just how important were relations between 
metropolitan economies and their colonies? Was it not the case (as the 
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opponents of imperialism and mercantilism insisted almost from the very 
beginning of Europe's ventures overseas) that commitments to empire 
operated to weaken national economies, to retard their development and 
ultimately to restrain Eurojjean progress towards industrial urban and 
affluent societies? 
PARTII. EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN THE FIRST EPOCH 
OF IMPERIALISM AND MERCANTILISM, 1415-1846 
Italy 
Long standing antipathies to empire remain interesting to consider 
because most European economies (including Germany, Switzerland, 
Austria and Scandinavia) eventually industrialised without committing 
much of their capital, manpower, entrepreneurial talent and military forces 
beyond the borders of Europe. Furthermore, Italy (Europe's leading 
economy of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) entered into long term 
economic decline as a result of the establishment of a Portuguese seaborne 
empire in Asia followed in time by the shift of the locus of oceanic trade 
from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and North Sea. 
That occurred because long before the voyages of discovery (and for 
some decades afterwards) the wealth of Italian states (Florence, Venice, 
Genoa and other cities) had been built up on the basis of entrepót trades 
between Asia, the Middle East and Europe. The distribution of eastem 
commodities, including porcelain, perfumes, aromatics, jewels, pepper and 
other spices, cotton fíbres and sugar, was dominated along the Black Sea 
and at its Mediterranean end (at Alexandria and Tripoli) by Italian 
merchants (Florentines, Genoese and above all by Venetians). Although 
the latter ruled several colonies, what Italians did with consummate skill 
was to act as middlemen (financiers as well as merchants) between east 
and west and to process eastem raw materials, raw sugar, cotton fibres, 
silk, drugs, etc., into finished commodities for sale at the ports and towns 
of the Mediterranean and northem Europe. 
Iberian expansión across the oceans and into other continents steadily 
undermined Italian prosperity and dominance in intercontinental trade. 
First, the Portuguese established direct routes by sea to India and beyond 
and transhipped an ever increasing share of Asian goods into Lisbon and 
Antwerp. Then Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French and English 
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investments in the tropical Americas brought the vast natural resources 
of a new world into direct competition with Asia and the Middle East 
and África. Sugar, coffee, jewels, spices, dyestuffs, cotton, drugs and above 
all buUion gradually carne to be procured more cheaply and easily across 
the Atlantic. New middlemen and entrepóts —the Portuguese through 
Lisbon, the Dutch through Amsterdam, the French through Bordeaux and 
the English through London— replaced Italian merchants, ports and city 
States in servicing European markets. 
Of course other factors contributed to the decline of the great 
Renaissance cities of Italy; not least the advent and consolidation of 
Ottoman power in the Eastem Mediterranean and the endless wars fought 
on Italian soil by the armies of France and Spain whose troops were, 
however, funded in large degree by silver brought in from the new world. 
Iberian imperialism, foUowed in the seventeenth century by the intrusión 
of Dutch and English sea power and merchant shipping into the 
Mediterranean, precipitated the economic decline of Italy that could not 
really be reversed before millions of Italians migrated to the Americas in 
the twentieth century. 
Iberian imperialism and competition surely arrested the development 
of Italy. Most of Western Europe eventually industrialised without direct 
recourse to political intrusión into economies and societies located upon 
other continents. What exactly did «imperialism» contribute to the long 
term economic development of those powers most actively and consistently 
involved in oceanic trade and the acquisition of colonies and resources 
outside Europe? That problem is best addressed country by country and 
comprehended against the background of aggressive competition and 
warfare that persisted for some four centuries among European states for 
national security, International power, the spoils of empire and the gains 
from trade. Our attempts to offer a summary is no substitute for 
engagement with the surveys of voluminous and ongoing historical research 
at national, regional, industrial and more micro levéis included and/or 
referenced in the national case studies upon which this survey is based. 
Portugal 
Portugal a small, rather poor but highly entrepreneurial society, began 
the great venture as early as 1415 with the seizure of Ceuta in Morocco. 
For the Portuguese (and the Spanish) the Atlantic and the Mediterranean 
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were home waters. In the second half of the fifteenth century Portuguese 
ships moved along the west coast of África (importing gold, ivory, spices 
and slaves) and then out into the Atlantic to colonise the Azores and 
Madeira. By 1487 Portuguese explorers reached the Cape and in 1498 
da Gama pushcd on to India. Portuguese imperial strategy then passed 
through two phases —focused first on Asia and, when that enterprise failed, 
on Brazil— acquired under the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. In Asia the 
Portuguese Crown emulated Venice and attempted through investment 
in sea power to secure a monopoly of oceanic commerce with Europe, 
particularly for the trades in pepper and spices (ginger, cinnamon, 
medicines), but also for the import of Indian and Chinese porcelain and 
textiles. 
To protect its claims to monopoly the Portuguese Crown established 
naval outposts and fortresses along the Red Sea, the Malabar coast and 
other ports around the Indian Ocean from where heavily armed and 
technically superior ships attacked Muslim, Indian and European shipping 
sailing in Asian waters without paying tribute to the Portuguese King. 
Naturally the audacious attempt to protect a transcontinental monopoly 
of commerce by such a small country (albeit with a good navy) failed. 
Already in the fifteenth-century Castille contested Portuguese domination 
of trade with África. By the late sixteenth century (when the Spanish arrived 
in the Philippines) Dutch and English ships soon followed and joined with 
Muslims in attacks on Portuguese fleets and naval bases. During the 
unification of the Iberian Crowns from 1580 to 1640, the aggression of 
the Dutch and the English became more assured and vicious. Between 
1600 and 1630 the Portuguese were driven from the Spice Islands by 
Dutch sea power. Squeezed almost entirely out of Asia (and África), 
Portugal recovered its colonies in Brazil and thereafter concentrated upon 
the exploitation of an Atlantic empire. Using coerced Indian and above 
all African slave labour Portuguese capitalists transhipped hard woods, 
dyestuffs, tobáceo, sugar and above all massive amounts of gold to Europe. 
Portugal's pay off for investment in Empire really came on stream in the 
eighteenth century and rested heavily on the Brazilian gold boom, 
1692-1770, and to some extent upon sugar. 
Feedbacks and spinoffs to the home economy tumed out to be 
disappointing. Local agriculture, which continued to employ most of the 
population could not be transformed, basically because technical 
possibilities readily and immediately available for raising the productivity 
of Mediterranean farm<ng before the advent of chemical fertilisers and 
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mechanised irrigation systems remained rather limited. Meanwhile the 
spread of African (or American) maize solved the problem of feeding the 
mass of Portugal's population and helped to provisión one huge city, 
Lisbon, and the smaller town of Oporto in the north. 
For several reasons the markets and raw materials of the Portuguese 
Empire did not lead on to the industrialisation of the domestic workforce. 
First the entrepreneurial talent available among a small population could 
make money more easily by engaging in mercantile enterprise in the carrying 
trades or could live well as rentiers on their investments in Brazilian mines 
and plantations. Secondly (and this is predictably the argument advanced 
by Portuguese historians) local industry never received proper protection 
against manufactured imports that came from France and then increasingly 
from England. If the first point is weighty, the second becomes redundant. 
Furthermore, such views seem to rest on two counterfactual assumptions, 
namely that Portugal might have developed the skilled manpower required 
to produce enough tradeable manufactures to exchange for the gold and 
primary produce of Brazil and secondly that the revenues of such a small 
State would have been sufficient to afford the protection necessary to 
defend its Brazilian empire (and its Asian and African interests) against 
potential rivals and aggressors (including, after 1640, Spain, France and 
Holland). 
Although the inflow of revenues from empire and transoceanic trade 
Consolidated and sustained a powerful monarchy, to survive as an 
independent country, Portugal needed support from a major naval power. 
The cost of that long and famous alliance with England was to allow English 
merchants and English industry favoured access to Portuguese domestic 
and imperial markets. Given its geopolitical position, its reliance on the 
carrying trade, the hostility of Spain and the predatory policies of the Dutch, 
Portugal's gains from investment in Empire had to be shared with England. 
Most Portuguese historians might say unequally shared. 
Empires (especially the colonial possessions and commercial monopolies 
of smaller European powers vulnerable to attack and movements for 
independence) are, however, expensive assets to retain. Portuguese 
investors (and presumably the population at large) certainly experienced 
cycles of prosperity during the long sixteenth century and again over the 
eighteenth century. Both ended, however, in political disasters. First in 
the seventeenth century came the costly struggle for independence from 
Spain and the collapse of commercial hegemony in Asia. Early in the 
nineteenth century the French occupation followed by the independence 
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of Brazil inflicted serious exogenous shocks to the economy. Although its 
population increased, at no time during the country's long involvement 
with empire and expansión overseas, 1415-1815, had the inflow of revenues 
accruing from plunder, conquest, trade and from servicing the international 
economy, been allocated towards the creation of an altemative, less 
vulnerable and productive base for agriculture and/or industry within the 
borders of Portugal. In economic, political and institutionai terms, Portugal 
remained a maritime, mercantile system and took a very long time to recover 
from the collapse of that imperial system which foUowed from the French 
invasión of 1807. 
Spain 
Why did the acquisition of a vast empire rich in natural resources and 
bullion apparently do so little to establish a basis for progress towards 
an industrial market economy in Spain? Unlike the Portuguese in Asia, 
Spanish explorers and merchants in the Americas did not encounter 
economies, populations and infra-structures already engaged in oceanic 
trade and prepared for mutually profitable commercial exchanges. Where 
city economies and civilisations existed (e.g. in México and Perú) they 
appeared as exploitable in the first instance only for plunder. Those early 
and unfortunate attacks (and above all the transmission of diseases) 
decimated Amerindian populations and rendered them incapable of 
sustained trade with Europeans whoever they were. To realise the potential 
inherent in the discovery of a resource abundant but labour scarce continent 
of the Americas, required continuous investment in exploration; the 
formation of social overhead capital (including ports, housing, interna! 
transportation, oceanic shipping); the establishment of new forms of 
political and commercial organisation; land clearance and the transplanting 
of European crops and animal populations across the Atlantic to new 
ecological environments. Spain's imperial venture required colonisation and 
settlement in alien and often hostile places. In short economic systems 
and capital assets which had taken centuries to build up in Europe and 
Asia had to be put in place quickly in the Americas because investors 
and govemments back home became impatient for easy and quick retums. 
For some fifteen decades after Columbus's historical voyages, the bulk 
of that investment, required to establish regular oceanic trade with Europe, 
continued to be undertaken by Spaniards. For nearly half a century (and 
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despite the fortunes brought home by famous adventurers from 
Extremadura) the balance of trade for commodities and services exchanged 
with coionies in the Americas remained heavily unfavourable for Spain. 
Fortuitously, (but in the long run not so fortunately) around 1545 the 
great mine of Potosi opened up. Within two decades silver imports turned 
the balance of trade the other way (i.e. imports exceed exports). By how 
much varied from cycle to cycle depending on the quantities of silver mined 
in the new world and fluctuations in its purchasing power on European 
markets. Nevertheless, even at times of peak shipments between 60 per 
cent and 70 per cent of the bullion arriving in Seville continued to be 
used for European exports of goods and services consumed and used by 
setders, slaves and native Indians in the Americas. 
In macro economic terms the discovery and exploitation of valuable 
sources of mineral wealth Icd to predictable changes in Spain's trading 
pattem and its structure of production. For example, inflows of silver and 
gold increased real wealth which raised the level of domestic dcmand for 
commodities and services that Spanish industry could meet only to a limitcd 
extent and by diverting resources au'ay from the production of tradcable 
goods. Surplus gold and silver was then used basically, however, to purchase 
the imports required to satisfy rising home dcmand which competed with 
the output of Spanish industry and in time led to industrial and urban 
decline. As Forsyth and Nicholas observcd: «Gold and silver inflows which 
allowed Spain to incrcase her consumption of both tradcable and 
non-tradeable goods required the economy to adjust its industrial and 
trading structure. The price system brought about the adjustment. Firstly, 
rising prices in the non-tradeable goods sector attracted resources from 
the traded goods sector. Secondly, the contraction of the tradcable goods 
sector resulted in a shortage of domestically produced trade goods which 
caused prices to rise attracting imports» " . 
Thus in so many ways, silver turned out for the development of Spain 
(not for Europe!) to be a lot less valuable as a return cargo than seemed 
to be the case at the time. On the credit side, the lure of treasure maintained 
interest, promoted investment and led to the settlement of young and 
energetic Iberians in the Americas. On the other side neither silver ñor 
gold are utilitarian metáis that could be utilised for construction or 
transformad into tools, weapons or household artefacts. When not used 
as money, gold and silver are crafted (oftcn very skilfully) into articles 
" Forsyth and Nicholas (1983). 
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of adornment for churches, monasteries, nunneries, aristocratic mansions 
and royal palaces. They are not raw materials upon which large scale and 
utilitarian forms of metallurgical industry, enterprises and jobs can be based. 
Bullion had, however, long been the stuff from which money could 
be minted and taxes paid. Wherever and whenever kings and princes can 
expropriate precious metáis, thcir traditional fiscal and, ipso facto, political 
problems are immediately alleviated. Their powers grow in proportion to 
the treasure placed at their disposal. Royal or state power in early modern 
Europe was constrained by the king's needs to raise taxes from his 
recalcitrant and often rebellious subjects and provinces. The more kings 
depended on taxes the less sovereign and autonomous they became. 
One way and another something like a quarter of all bullion mined 
in the Indies passed directly under the control of Spanish monarchs. This 
gave that Ilabsburg state immediate control over a much larger share of 
the resources required to fund whatever expenditures Charles V, Philip 
II and their successors chose to make. Guaranteed flows of bullion also 
formed the basis upon which Spanish kings could borrow money from 
European bankers and mcrchants. It substituted for taxes and provided 
the security for the rapid accumulation of an enormous royal debt. Bullion 
not only underpinned regal power but augmented the incomes of the 
aristocracy and thereby reduced their rapacious tendencies to prey upon 
the crown estáte or to use their territorial powers and property rights to 
extort rents from merchants, businessmen and towns. In short, colonisation 
helped to consolidate and stabilise traditional institutions and structures 
of power, status and property rights within Spain. 
Neither of these fiscal and political attributes flowing from imports 
of treasure through Habsburg coffers can be represented as necessarily 
inimical to the longer term development of the Spanish economy. It turned 
out that way because the Crown deployed its huge windfall from the 
Americas to fund diplomatic, strategic and imperial policies that produced 
entirely limited long term macro economic benefits for Spain. Part of the 
state's military and naval expenditures were, however, necessary to 
concéntrate economic and political gains from empire in Spanish hands. 
Spaniards had invested massively in the discovery and development of an 
empire and relied on the Crown to exelude, tax and control foreigners 
who wished to do business with and within their possessions in the 
Americas. Any kind of mercantilist strategy to maximise profits from 
imperialism proved, however, difficult to implement for an empire dispersed 
across Europe, as well as the Americas and Asia. Ex post it is clear, however, 
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that the Habsburgs allocated the bulk of their domestic taxes and imperial 
revenues towards the pursuit of European and dynastic politics and never 
invested enough in the naval power required to protect Spanish assets 
in the Americas. Spain soon lost territory in the Caribbean and could only 
intermittently and partially contain the conspiracy spearheaded by its Dutch 
and English enemies to smuggle goods into and out of Southern America. 
These protestan! «free riders», who made no contribution to overheads, 
denuded retums from the Spanish investments for long stretches of the 
period before the Industrial Revolution. Constrained by a European-wide 
Empire, Spanish mercantilism rarely worked as effectively it did for the 
maritime ambitions of Holland and England. 
Although Spain was cleariy a much larger and better endowed national 
economy than Portugal, it too never accumulated enough capital, skilled 
manpower and other resources required to prevent commerce with its 
Empire from becoming steadily more multilateral. When Spain acquired 
colonies overseas in the late fifteenth century, the domestic economy could 
not be described as among the most advanced in Europe? At that time 
Spanish industry and agriculture did not look poised for export led or 
import based growth. Yet some feedbacks from imperial trade can be 
represented as positive. For example, bullion inflows helped to intégrate 
domestic markets and encouraged inter-regional trade. Maize and other 
botanical transfers augmented the capacity of local agricultures to feed 
more people and to sustain urbanisation. In the sixteenth and again in 
eighteenth century exports to the colonies did impart a real stimulus to 
several industries and to some towns but the small share of industrial goods 
and commercial services supplied to Latin America by Spanish firms and 
merchants before the break up of the Empire after 1808, stands in contrast 
to the significant linkages forged between the British economy and Britain's 
overseas territories and markets between 1688 and 1815. 
Perhaps (and like Portugal) this predictable outcome occurred because 
the opportunities to invest in the facilities and organisation required simply 
to import bullion and raw materials from the Americas satisfied whatever 
propensities to risk capital and to stimulate any entrepreneurial talent that 
was around? Perhaps the Empire provided Spaniards of that time with 
too many comfortable and profitable ways of becoming rich, as soldiers, 
as royal creditors, as merchants, as advisers and as well rewarded sleeping 
partners to foreigners forced to comply with the rational strategies pursued 
by Spaniards in seeking rents from outsiders who wished to trade within 
their possessions overseas. 
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Modem economic historians will wish to quantify the scale and scope 
of the impact of empire upon major European economies involved with 
trade and colonisation overseas. For Portugal, a small economy with a 
population of less than 1.5 million, connexions with empire through trade, 
migration and capital flows, could only have been relatively more important 
(in a macro accountancy sense) than they tumed out to be for Spain, 
a much larger, more diverse and far from backward economy in the fifteenth 
century. The albeit imperfect data tentatively offered in Yun's paper in 
this volume suggests that most of the relevant ratios (including trade to 
gross domestic product, emigration to total population and imports of 
bullion to domestic product), are simply too small to explain more than 
a fraction of Spain's overall record of economic growth between 1492 and 
the loss of its American colonies, 1808-24. Endogenous factors, particularly 
agriculture, remained dominant. At several well observed póles de 
croissance, connexions between metropole and empire mattered but 
throughout the long cycles of upswing, downswing and stagnation that 
marked those early centuries of Spanish imperialism, such connexions 
remained too constricted to make that much difference one way or the 
other to growth, structural change and movements in average standards 
of living for the Spanish population as a whole '^. 
On the positive side Spanish imperialism, even its golden age, 
apparently did something, but too little, to propel the economy forward 
at an accclerated rate. On the negative side the well analysed connexions 
with the American colonies as documented in pessimistic interpretations 
of Spain's economic history do not convince us that imperialism can be 
held ih any significant way responsible for the long term, relative retardation 
of the economy before it converged towards northern European levéis of 
productivity after the Second Worid War. Interloping by other powers and 
the politically inspired (or uninspired) allocation of resources by the 
Habsburg state simply explain why Spain failed to maximise the potential 
for long term development derivable from expansión overseas. 
France 
To the chagrín of Spain an unearned and increasing share of the benefits 
from transcontinental commerce and territorial expansión which began to 
"• Prados de la Escosura (1993). 
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flow back into Europe from the mid sixteenth century onwards really 
accrucd to two powers: Holland and above all to England. Yet France 
(Europe's major military power from 1648 to 1815) also competed for 
territory and commerce in the Americas and Asia. Its empire offered an 
important stimulus to urban and industrial growth in the eighteenth century 
basically through trade with colonies in the Caribbean, especially with San 
Domingue and to a smaller extent with Canadá (Quebec). At the peak 
of French involvement with its colonies in the 1780s, purchases of sugar, 
coffee and other tropical groceries accounted for 37 per cent of total 
imports and the colonies took a quarter of French exports, of which 36 
per cent consisted of manufactured goods. Although the share had risen 
to become the most important single component of total trade beyond 
the borders of Fránce, in terms of French gross domestic product imperial 
conncxions remained small. As in Spain, it had certainly increased rapidly 
over the eighteenth century and recovcred after the American War, 
1784-89, but the economic impact of colonial trade tended to be regionally 
concentrated on the Atlantic ports (especially Bordeaux, but also Nantes 
and Le Havre) and their immediate hinterlands. French colonies purchased 
linens, lace, woollens and cotton fabrics, as well as fine flour and wines. 
Most of their exports of sugar, coffee and other tropical groceries were 
transhipped and re-exported by French merchants to the rest of Europe. 
That business was profitable but, considering the risks, not inordinantly 
lucrative. 
Although the threshold costs of colonisation and the establishment of 
commerce could not be depicted as expcnsive, the costs of defending its 
colonies turned out to be enormous and negative for the development 
of France. For example, the first French Empire contributed substantially 
to the fiscal crisis of the state, 1763-89, which led on to the French 
Revolution and a quarter of a century of European and global warfare 
from which the French economy emerged devastated and crippled in its 
competition with Britain. 
In strategic terms France remained a continental power. Bourbon 
governments never really concentrated naval and military resources on 
securing territories in the Americas and defending trades on the Atlantic. 
Nevertheless, aspirations to empire in the Americas and Asia certainly 
promoted and contributed to costly wars with England which eventually 
led to the crisis of the state. That crisis which erupted into revolution, 
internal instability and a commitment to warfare, 1789-1815, severely set 
back the evolution of France towards an industrial market economy. By 
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1815 and after eight expensive conflicts, France had lost the second 
hundred years war with England and all prospects of being anything but 
a second rank imperial power. Richelieu's and Colbert's visión of a thriving 
Atlantic economy based upon Bordeaux, Nantes, Le Havre and Rouen 
was thrown away and eventually destroyed by Napoleon's prematurc drive 
for an early European common market. As Thiers recognised, «nous n'avons 
pas gagné la bataille de Trafalgar. Nous ne sommes pas restes maitres 
des mers et nous n'avons pas 200 millions de consommateurs comme 
l'Angleterre les posséde. Voila tout le secret de notre inferiorité» ' ' . 
Holland 
Most historians who attempt to draw up balance sheets for the 
mercantilist age of European imperialism recognise that ttt'o protestant 
societies gamered «extraordinary» shares of the benefits from connexions 
with Asia, África and the Americas. Colonisation and commerce with other 
continents did more to carry England and HoUand towards successful 
market economies than the strategy of overseas expansión did for any other 
nations in westem Europe, especially France. Already by the mid 
seventeenth century a disproportionate amount of the profits obtained from 
servicing intercontinental trade accrued to Anglo-Dutch merchants, 
shippers, bankers, brokers and insurers. Large (but alas impossible to 
quantify) shares of oceanic trade within and beyond the empires of Holland 
(and eventually Britain) carne to be financed, shipped, insured and 
distributed first, 1570-1688, through Amsterdam and later through London. 
Cargoes of manufactured commodities and processed foodstuffs, exported 
to Asia, África and the Americas, were initially made in Holland but 
increasingly in England. Imports from Asia and the Americas, including 
tropical groceries, (sugar tea, cocoa, coffee, spices and pepper) and 
industrial raw materials (hardwoods, botanical drugs, tobáceo, cotton fibres, 
raw silk, dyestuffs, furs, oils and wax), provided inputs for industries located 
within and around Dutch, English, Scottish and Irish, as well as other 
ports in western Europe. Those raw materials manufactured for sale, mainly 
in European markets, were also returned in more processed and valuable 
form to Asian, African, and American consumers. European merchants, 
first Genoese and Portuguese but later Dutch and English businessmen, 
Lacour-Gayct (1952), vol. 5, p. 76. 
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financed and organised the transhipment of crops, minerals (especially 
bullion), manufactured commodities and factors of production (particularly 
slaves but also indentured servants and migrants) from latitude to latitude 
and from geographical zone to geographical zone. Profits from servicing 
and funding inter-cum-intra continental trade which increased in line with 
the growth of global commerce occurred in ever increasing proportion to 
Dutch and English merchants whose enterprise also actively promoted the 
development of trade and specialisation by región, country and by 
cóntinent. 
Between 1585-1713 Holland continued to be envied as the most 
advanced and successful commercial economy in Europe. As Josiah Child 
observed in 1688: «ITie prodigious income of the Netherlands in their 
domestic and foreign trade riches and multitude of shipping is the envy 
of present and may be the wonder of future generations» "*. Holland 
compares with Portugal in that it represents an example of a small, 
competitive but politically vulnerable power taking fuU advantage of 
opportunities offered by the expansión of European trade with other 
continents. From a good site and solid domestic economic base, rooted 
in an advanced agriculture, extensive proto industrialisation and long 
participation in intra European trade, on a per capita basis Dutch 
merchants, bankers and shippers invested heavily in intercontinental trade 
and in the European imperialism that went along with that commerce " . 
Dutch resources and considerable entrepreneurial talents came to be 
concentrated in three connected but separable types of mercantile 
endeavour. First (and most successfully), the Dutch operated for nearly 
three centuries as major carriers, shippers and distributors of commodities 
produced by the farms, plantations, mines and firms of Portuguese, Spanish, 
French and British possessions and dependencies in Asia, África, the 
Caribbean and the Americas. Legally and illegally, directly and indirectly, 
generations of Dutch middlemen profited from supplying the markets of 
other European empires and trading bases with the food, textiles, metáis, 
weapons, transport equipment, tools and above all the slaves that they 
required to develop colonies and trade in the Americas, Asia and África. 
En route Dutch ships engaged in shorter distance exchanges from port 
to port before they returned to Amsterdam with the produce, minerals 
and luxury manufactures of tropical zones which they then processed, 
'" Lctwin(1969), p. 41. 
" de Vries and van dcr Woudc (1997). 
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packaged and distributed around Europe. As middlemen and fínanciers 
the Dutch reaped their largest and most persistent flows of the gains from 
intercontinental trade, from the extensión of credit, from transportation, 
and from the storage and the distribution of exports and imports from 
European colonies, plantations and dependencies overseas. 
Secondly, over the first half of the seventeenth century the Dutch ousted 
the Portuguese and estabüshed a network of trading pK)sts and plantations 
of their own in Asia under the control of the Verenigde Oost Indische 
Compagnie. Like the Portuguese (but perhaps with more efficiency) Dutch 
naval power attempted to reserve the transhipment and sale of Asian spices 
(mace, nutmeg, cloves and cinnamon and even pepper and coffee) to 
Europe for the profit of Holland. Returns varied and diminished over time 
as gradually commerce between Europe and the East carne to be dominated 
by imports of tea and textiles where competition from rival French, Danish 
and above all English East India Companies maintained prices and profits 
closer to competitive levéis. 
Thirdly, Dutch colonisation and settlement across the Atlantic looks 
decidedly unsuccessful. They failed to establish a foothold in North America 
and the Portuguese reconquered their original plantations in Brazil after 
the brief but very costly attempt at occupation by the Dutch between 
1629-54. At that time they also lost bases in Angola and the Gold Coast. 
New Amsterdam passed under British control and became New York in 
1664. The Dutch colonised islands (the Antilles and Curasao) and tracts 
of territory (the Guyanas) in the Americas but their empire served basically 
to facilítate carrying trades with Iberian, French and British possessions. 
Dutch colonies in the Atlantic never produced sugar, tropical groceries 
or anything else in the volumes required to meet more than smallish 
fractions of European demand. Meanwhile, they suffered from British, 
French and Iberian naval attacks in times of war. Apart from spice islands 
in Asia and peripheral colonies in the Americas, Dutch participation in 
the first era of European imperialism remained heavily concentrated on 
supplying mercantile services: shipping, credit, insurance, packaging and 
some long term investment in the fixed assets of English, French and 
Iberian empires overseas. 
As intermediaries the Dutch remained vulnerable to the enforcement 
of 
navigation codes and mercantilist regulations designed to exelude then 
from commerce with rival European empires. They frequently found that 
their ships, forts, trading posts and islands came under attack, particularly 
when they prudentially opted (or were compelled) from time to time to 
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ally with the wrong side in that long sequence of wars between England 
and France between 1689 and 1815. As a smaU and far from centralised 
State on the mainland of Europe, Holland could hardiy defend its borders 
against French power. Indeed the two wars against Louis XIV created a 
large public debt, led to persistently high levéis of taxation and transformed 
Holland into a satellite of England. The Republic was thricc invaded, first 
in 1672, again at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession and in 
War against Revolutionary France, when its already ailing economy and 
diminishing place in intercontinental trade were both scriously disrupted 
by the long political crisis and subsequent occupation by French forces 
between 1784-1814. 
Largely for political and strategic reasons, Holland failed to maintain 
anything like the extraordinar>' shares of global commerce it enjoyed during 
its primacy' in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Trade clearly 
mattered for the countr>''s long term development but whether the diffuse 
and fluctuating flows of benefits derived in large measure from servicing 
European intercontinental commerce and colonisation carried the Dutch 
economy forward and up to plateaus of possibility for development, that 
seem counterfactually unimaginable without its sustained commitment to 
Europe's imperial project is not that clear. On the one hand, several newly 
established industries, gains in productivity, rates of capital formation, the 
accumulation of skills and the acquisition ot technologies, can be connected 
to Holland's participation in European oceanic trade. On the other, the 
gains do not look significant enough to gainsay the impression that a post 
hoc cost benefit analysis (if such an account could ever be constructed) 
would indícate that returns to the nation from involvement in Empirc were 
not that substantial for long term economic growth of the Dutch Republic. 
The United Kingdom 
Then and now the British have been credited with having secured the 
«lion's share» of the benefits accruing to Europeans from colonisation, 
commerce and trade with África, Asia and the Americas. Part of their 
success in international trade and services occurred not merely because 
England (and Scotland) avoided massive investment in the start up costs 
involved in the establishment and expansión of commerce between Europe 
and other continents but also because the British emulated Dutch methods 
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of conducting international business and absorbed Dutch capital into joint 
mercantile ventures beyond the seas and frontiers of Europe. 
Sincc the Reformation politically and ideologically HoUand and England 
shared common catholic enemies, Spain and France. Even at the height 
of three Anglo-Dutch wars in the late seventeenth century, London and 
other British ports continued to adopt the techniques and forms of 
organisation that had made HoUand and Amsterdam successful. Dutch 
banking, corporate forms of organisation, insurance, shipbuilding, nautical 
techniques, craftsmen, merchants, machinery and industrial technology 
diftused easily across the North Sea. After a Civil War and the execution 
of its Stuart king, the restored English state redesigned its fiscal and 
financial system along Dutch lines. In 1688 to ensure that kingdom's 
foreign, imperial and taxation policies supported liberty and commerce, 
parliament invited a Dutch protestant to take the throne. Thereafter, Dutch 
savings poured into the English national debt. Dutch merchants and 
tinanciers settled in London. Like the bourgeoisie of that other vulnerable 
maritime power, Portugal, Dutch capitalists welcomed the protection that 
their mercantile endeavours outside Europe derived from the powerful 
Hanoverian navy. On the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean, many joined 
their fortunes to the aggressive mercantilism of eighteenth-century England. 
In Asian and África they prudently avoided provocative competition and 
tacitly opened their markets and carrying trades to British shipping and 
British manufactures. 
But how far did England's famous transition to an industrial market 
economy emerge within a mercantile and mercantilist matrix dominated 
by colonisation and commerce with continents beyond Europe? To an 
important but not overwhelming extent is the short answer to this pertinent 
question. Intercontinental trade represented only a share (albeit a growing 
proportion) of total trade with markets beyond the frontiers of the United 
Kingdom. All relevant ratios (calculated within the framework of national 
accounts) are simply not large enough to provide Britain's external 
economic relations with the statistical underpinning required to be 
convincingly represented as «the major propellant» for the British economy 
as a whole. Nevertheless, for industry (the economy's leading sector) 
transcontinental markets and sources of supply, as well as the flows of 
income derived from servicing the growing trades with África, Asia and 
the Americas, add up to components and form the contexts for explanations 
of British industrialisation as it occurred between 1688 and 1846 that were 
surely significant compared to «exogenous forces» operating upon other 
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European economies. That significance cannot, however, be depicted as 
vital or even extraordinary. As usual for economies of any size, a very 
high share of national output continued to be sold within the realm. Most 
of the raw materials, inputs, factors of production, knowledge and 
technologies required for the growth and diversification of industrial 
production continued to be procured on domestic markets. Britain's 
productive and responsive agriculture, cheap and accessible supplies of 
energy, its flexible institutions and above all the skills, capacities and 
attitudes embodied in a national workforce, that had accumulated by way 
of long traditions of participation in intemal and intra-European trade, 
provided the preconditions for an effective response to opportunities to 
compete for economic gains from intercontinental trade and empire. 
The áreas, industries and margins of the economy where commerce 
with protected and imperial markets overseas mattered for the growth of 
industry, towns and urban services have been well analysed in secondary 
literature. After protracted debate these linkages can no longer be presented 
as small and dispensable components of British industrialisation as it 
proceeded from one long cycle to another between 1688 and 1815. Alas, 
all the numbers purporting to estímate the gains from trade in general 
and imperial trade in particular, generally ignore externalities and rest upon 
contestable assumptions about the eighteenth-century economy, which 
include the persistence of full employment and an even less plausible 
assumption that the allocation of resources (used by prívate enterprise and 
the State) to engage in intercontinental trade might in theory have been 
only slightly more productive than their allocation to almosl equally 
profitable alternatives, producing for the home market and for 
intra-European trade. 
Needless to say, the chronologies, assumptions and latterly the data 
upon which the recently published and rather dismissive assessments of 
the significance of trade, mercantilism and empire are based, have all been 
challenged ^". Revisionists now suggest that since Adam Smith the liberal 
critique of Hanoverian commercial and imperial policy has dominated too 
much of the high ground for academic discourse and that it is time to 
rescue the widespread political consensus about empire that marked the 
period from the condescension of posterity. Very few of its critics writing 
between 1688 and 1815 developed an alternative strategy for national 
development that offered to carry Britain to the expensively acquired 
'" O'Bricn and Engcrman (1991), pp. 177-209. 
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position within the international economic and political order that the 
country occupied when Castlereagh signed the Treaty of Vienna. Over 
the period most statesmen, members of Parliament, Anglican scholars, 
mercantilist intellectuals and above all merchants, perceived that economic 
progress, national security and the integration of the kingdom might well 
come from sustained levéis of investment in global commerce, naval power 
and whenever necessary, the acquisition of bases and territory overseas. 
Sceptical economic historians who, with hindsight, now suggest that realistic 
and less costly counterfactual strategies were in fact available, might lay 
them out for inspection and explain why a «polite but commercially 
aggressive» people failed to entertain, let alone adopt, them between 1688 
and 1815? 
Revisionists will concede that the outward thrust led to burdens of 
taxation which increased dramatically over time and that taxes distorted 
and constricted the growth of the economy. Nevertheless, they will also 
observe that the degree of compliance secured from Parliaments (disposed, 
rhetorically at least, to resist all taxes) and from a traditionally recalcitrant 
body of taxpayers, suggests that a strong degree of consensus existed about 
the broad objectives and profitability of state expenditures. That consensus, 
embedded in the commercial and imperialistic cultures of British society, 
was sustained, moreover, by fiscal policies that avoided direct forms of 
taxation, exempted the «necessities» of a potentially disorderly underclass 
from indirect taxes and structured their incidence in ways that kept the 
economy on course. 
Another familiar cost of imperial expansión: borrowing by the 
govemment (represented in figures published regularly and showing an 
alarmingly rapid accumulation of the national debt) funded the immediate 
and sharp rises in expenditures on the naval and military forces required 
to combat Britain's foes and rivals at times of conflict. Some «crowding 
out» of prívate investment most certainly occurred but there seems to be 
no hard evidence that loans raised for the state occurred on a scale sufficient 
to significantly depress prívate investment in the infra-structural facilities 
and capital goods required for the long term for the development of the 
economy. On the contrary, there may be valid arguments (well rehearsed 
in the mercantilist literature of the period) to conceive of high levéis of 
public «investment» in naval power and military forcé as complementar)' 
and necessary to sustain, what became in international terms, rather 
impressive rates of capital accumulation by the prívate sector. For a 
mercantilist age, marked by persistent recourse to warfare among European 
'fo: 
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powers, it now seems anachronistic to classify expenditures under 
antithetical labels (derived from a modern national accounts framework) 
inte «public consumption» and «prívate investment». Furthermore, some 
modern growth economists now deduct defence expenditures as 
government consumption '. At the time such allocations were more 
realistically regarded as connected and inseparable elements oí a package 
of policies that aggregated through time into a successful strategy for good 
order, for economic development and for the defence of the realm. 
At sea, Europe's mercantilist era came virtually to an end at Trafalgar, 
1805, and on land at Waterloo a decade later. When Castlereagh signed 
the Treaty of Vienna (which successfully preserved the balance of power 
for several decades before the unification of Germany) Britain had emerged 
as the hegemonic naval, imperial and commercial power in Europe and 
was, moreover, in the middle of its industrial revolution. Massive and 
sustained public investment in military and naval power had been rcquired 
to reach a position, from where national securíty could be taken for granted 
and London's dominance in servicing global commerce and British 
industry's lead position in the sale of manufactures on imperial and world 
markets seemed assured for decades to come. 
As the twentieth century draws to a cióse, there no longer seems to 
be valid historical arguments for accepting traditional liberal 
perceptions which are traditionally prone to denígrate connexions between 
Britain's successful pursuit of mercantilism, trade and empire on the one 
hand and its famous industrial revolution on the other. Ñor is the alternative 
case (favoured by Marxists) that Britain deployed its overwhelming 
competitive advantage in naval power to build up a mercantiie and industrial 
economy at the expense of its European competitors by exploiting the 
populations and resources of other continents in order to secure 
extraordinary shares of global trade and services, anything like the whole 
story. The First Industrial Revolution is far too complex an event to be 
explained in simplistic terms. 
Europe's gainsfrom the First Age of Imperialism and Mercantilisrn 
Britain came late to the imperial endeavour but surely reaped a «lion's 
share» of the gains from European wide investment in intercontinental 
•' Barro and Lee (1993). 
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commerce and empires overseas. After 1815 all the economies of Western 
Europe recovered from the ravages of revolutionary warfare on the basis 
of capital stocks, institutions, knowledge, technologies and commercial 
relations that had developed ovcr four centuries of productive 
interconnexions with other continents. At that juncture and without the 
expansión of European power into África, Asia and above all into the 
Americas, the economies of Europe would have been poorer, the 
composition of their national products would have been more agricultural 
and less industrial in form and lower proportions of their workforces would 
have been employed in industr\' and resident in towns. After some three 
decades of serious disruption (1789-1819) Europe's potential for recovery 
and for further and even more rapid economic advance —based upon 
Science and technology, as well as the resumption of trade, could only 
have been less promising. 
Real and substantial gains for the long run development of Europe 
can be represented as a tangible bounty that took the form of foodstuffs, 
raw materials, minerals and manufactured commt>dities from other 
continents that flowed into European ports —falteringly at first— but 
rapidly when their prices and costs fell after 1650. Any list will include: 
tropical groceries (pepper, cinnamon, cloves, nutmegs, ginger, cocoa, 
coffee, tea, sugar, groundnuts and tobáceo); basic foodstuffs (fish and fish 
oils, maize, potatoes, tomatoes, beans, chilies, rhubarb; botanical medicines 
(cocaine, quinine, narcotics); industrial raw materials (hardwoods, raw silk, 
cotton fibres, furs, wax, Índigo, cochineal and other dyestuffs); 
manufactures (porcelain, jewels, textiles); and above all the gold and silver 
from Southern America ^^ . 
The macro economic significance of these concrete manifestations of 
gains from the first age of European imperialism is, however, more difficult 
to elabórate and impossible to quantify. Several European industries were 
based upon import substitution for manufactures originally purchased from 
Asia and the Islamic woHd- including silk, cotton textiles, porcelain and 
jewellery. Capital formation, the establishment of firms and the employment 
of labour also occurred in order to process raw materials carried from 
other continents into major European ports; and that led on to the 
establishment of a range of industries including: silk and cotton textiles, 
the dyeing, printing and finishing of cloth, fumiture made from hardwoods, 
sugar refining, coffee roasting, tobáceo processing and chocolate making. 
Landes(1979), 
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Spices, chilles, tomatoes, coffee, tea, cocea and above all sugar, not only 
brought interest and diversity into monotonous European diets but 
(together with the curative and energising properties of botanical medicines, 
tea, rhubarb, quinine, curare and fish oils) such imports raised propensities 
and capacities to labour among national workforces. More significant are 
the calorific additions to basic food supplies and the contingent growth 
of European populations and cities prometed by the introduction of maize, 
potatoes and fish (from remeter Atlantic waters). Feedbacks from imperial 
trades to the growth of such major ports as Seville, Cádiz, Lisbon, Antwerp, 
Amsterdam, Bordeaux, London, Bristol, Glasgow and Hamburg, and to 
the shipbuilding, shipping, commercial and financial services that formed 
an integral part of their development and of the prosperity of their 
hinterlands are still visible today and were regarded as important at the 
time. 
Although massive imports of precious metáis from the Americas and 
África are considered by historians to have constricted prospects for the 
long run economic development of Spain and Portugal, bullion turned 
eut to be instrumental for the development of a European and an 
intemational monetary system. Minted into coins and widely accepted 
collateral for instruments of credit and paper circulation, silver and gold 
from África, but overwhelmingly from Southern America, provided the basis 
used for a necessary expansión in the global supply of money. Without 
that flexibility and because something like one third of the strategic goods 
and primary produce from the Baltic economies could not be covered by 
commodity exports, intra-European trades from the Baltic to Western 
Europe and Mediterranean would surely have been constrained? 
Trade with China, India and other parts of Asia must surely have been 
even more constricted because for long stretches of the sixteenth, 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, approximately three quarters of the 
commodities purchased in Asia and carried back to Europe could not be 
covered by revenues received from Europe's commodity exports? Bullion 
flowing into Iberia acted as the almighty dollar of the day. One way or 
another Europeans obtained the silver they needed to carry on trading 
with the Baltic, Asia and with each other because the Iberians (like the 
Americans after the Second World War) ran déficits on their balance of 
payments accounts. That inevitable outcome stabilised European economies 
and facilitated their growth and transformation. 
Political historians will also point out that it was Habsburg power 
(funded by American silver) that finally checked the thrust of Ottoman 
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imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Balkans. Turkish 
armies stood at the gates of Vienna twice: in 1529 and again in 1683. 
Furthermore, the pretensions of Charles V and Philip 11 to universal 
monarchy (backed by revenues from the New World) reinforced the 
traditional conviction of Europeans that politically their continent should 
remain organised as a multi state system and not as a new holy Román 
empire ruled from Spain. Over the long run Europe's peculiar state system 
with aU its rivalries and expensively maintained balance of power 
contributed positively (through the movement of people and capital and 
through the irrepressible diffusion of knowledge and technologies across 
frontiers) towards the evolution of European societies into competitive and 
technologically progressive market economies ^\ 
In diverse, unpredicted and complex ways the imperialism of the 
mercantilist era helped to place the already interconnected economies of 
Western Europe upon a growth path that eventually provided their 
populations with markedly higher standards of living than the rest of the 
world. Yet, arguments that reify the expansión of Western Europe overseas 
into the engine of its economic success compared to continents (until 
recently represented as a Third World) should be resisted and severely 
qualified. Clearly that particular motor (conquest and trade) did little to 
promote industrialisation in the Iberian peninsula. Indeed historians of 
Spain and Portugal now seem more inclined to present their nations' early 
and sustained connexions with empires in Asia and the Americas as being 
partly responsible for their late and slow transitions to industrial market 
economies. Although they recognise that the severe economic disruptions 
caused by French invasions, 1807-14, and the loss of imperial control over 
colonies in the Americas (which with support from Britain occurred in 
the wake of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars) makes it difficult 
to assess potential (but after the event unrealised) gains from a 
counterfactual retention of empires in South America over the nineteenth 
century ^'*. 
France (or rather the country's western ports and their hinterlands) 
also began to derive benefits from investments in transatlantic trade and 
colonisation during the eighteenth century. Again potential retums to 
France were severely constrained by the loss of Canadá and its foothold 
in India during the Seven Years War and dwindled to insignificance after 
" Jones (1981). 
'' Pedreira (1993) and Prados de la Escosura (1988). 
57 
PATRICK KARL OBRIEN ANU LEANDRO PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA 
the destruction of the plantation colony of Haiti and the loss of other 
Caribbean islands to Britain during the long wars, 1793-1815. 
For more than a centur>' Holland's highly visible and successful 
exploitation of the opportunities offered by intercontinental commerce and 
colonisation aroused the envy and antagonism of rivals, particularly Britain 
and France, who used military and naval forcé to weaken the Republic's 
power and its economy. Dutch merchants and capital then played a role 
in Britain's rise to a hegemonic position in the expanding global economy. 
Even for England, where the pace and pattern of industrialisation between 
the Civil War and the victory for free trade some two centuries later can 
be most clearly associated with imperialism and the expansión of 
intercontinental trade, the macro economic significance of the benefits 
should not be inflated. 
Yel the positive correlations to long term growth seem visible enough 
in the British example. For example, a high but by no means a dominant 
share (but possibly up to 30 per cent to 40 per cent) of all the extra 
industrial output manufactured in Britain during the early stages of 
industrialisation, 1660-1815, was exponed overseas; mainly to the 
Americas, Asia and África in addition to exports sent to other European 
countries, who derived their capacities to spend some more money on 
British goods from participation in world trade. Profits from servicing global 
commerce helped to fund the expansión of British industry, to promote 
internal transportation, to develop financial intermediation, distribution and 
other activities closely associated with industry; as well as the growth of 
housing and social overhead capital required to support the extraordinary 
growth of London and other port towns. British merchants became 
industrial entrepreneurs, bankers and members of Pariiament. They 
successfully lobbied aristocratic governments to créate the fiscal, legal and 
institutional conditions for the cfficient operation of commodity, capital 
and labour markets. 
Receipts from exports procured strategic imports including (timber, 
pitch, tar, hemp and bar iron), as well as such important raw materials 
as silk, flax, cotton, dyestuffs and sugar. Imported luxuries (tobáceo, tea, 
alcoholic beverages and high quality textiles) provided incentives for harder 
work, fed customs duties into the Exchequer and funded the powerful 
navy required for the security of the realm, for the protection of trade 
and the expansión of its possessions overseas. 
For the First Industrial Nation there could be no gainsaying the positive 
connexions between imperialism, trade and long term economic growth. 
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which by 1846 had helped to elévate the British economy into the workshop 
of the world ^'. Nevertheless, there were other, and probably more 
significant, endogenous factors at work including: the kingdom's highly 
productive agriculture, its abundant and accessible dep<5sits of cheap energy 
and the steady accumulation of a skilled workforce capable of inventing, 
developing and working with new machinery. Britain had participated in 
networks of intra European trade, in European migration and in the 
exchange of scientific and technical knowledge for centurias before 
Columbus, Da Gama and other navigators embarked upon their famous 
voyages of discovery. Finally, the conjuncture of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wats depressed the economies, interrupted the trade and 
severely reduced the empires of all British competitors, particularly France, 
but also Spain, Portugal and HoUand ^^. At the Congress of Vienna an 
Austrian General observad that «Great Britain has no greater obligation 
to any mortal on earth than this ruffian (Napoleón). For through the events 
which he has brought about, England's greatness, prosperity and wealth 
have risen high. She is mistress of the sea and neither in this dominión 
ñor in world trade has she a single rival to fear» ^^ . 
PART m . THE SECOND EPOCH: LIBERAL IMPERIALISM 
AND DECOLONISATION, 1846-1989 
The Liberal International Order, 1846-1914 
Once the Revolutionary Wars and their aftermath faded into history, 
intellectuals revived and elaborated upon suggestions designed to persuade 
governments that, since a balance of power within Europe had been secured 
and the International economic order was moving towards free trade, the 
retention (let alone expansión) of empires could only be counterproductive 
for the vitality of Europe's economies. Such arguments had appeared in 
the writings of Josiah Tucker and Adam Smith in the 1770s and in Jeremy 
Bentham's considered polemic, «Emancípate Your Colonies», presented 
at the outbreak of war in 1793. They flowered again in speeches, essays 
and books published by a long line of European economists and liberal 
intellectuals from the 1830s right down to 1914. 
" For the most recent quantitative assessmcnt, see Cuenca Esteban (1997), pp. 879-906. 
'" 0'Brien(1998). 
" Kennedy (1985) p. 123. 
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For brief periods in the nineteenth century such «Cobdenite» 
recomnienclaüons for severing formal political ties between European states 
and their colonies overseas received something like a sympathetic hearing 
from statesmen and public opinión. Nevertheless, and even during years 
which witnessed the ascendancy of a free trade ideology (1846-1879) no 
territory was given up. On the contrary for decade after decade after the 
loss of the Iberian colonies in Southern America, and particularly during 
the high tide of European imperialism from 1882-1903, empires continued 
to expand under liberal, conservative and autocratic govemments alike. 
Although Denmark, Sweden and Holland sold territories overseas to 
Britain, France and the United States and concessions towards local self 
government marked constitutional and political relations between 
metropolitan govemments and their «empires» between 1815-1939, 
European powers continued to establish and retain colonies right down 
to the decades of decolonisation after the Second World War. 
TABLE 1 
The Foundation and Terminaron o/Colonies 
Years 
1415-1775 
1775-1825 
1826-1921 
1926-1969 
SOURCE: Bergesen (1980), pp. 237-38 *. 
By 1800 Europe and European possessions and settlements overseas 
occupied 55 per cent of the world's surface, in 1878, 67 per cent and 
by 1914 (when the only parts of the world that had never been colonised 
induded China, Japan, Siam, Arabia, Tibet, Mongolia and Turkey) that 
ratio had risen to an astonishing 84 per cent. The dramatic jump up to 
84 per cent during the years of the «new imperialism», 1882-1903, 
coincided with the spread of the gold standard and the increasing 
intergration of the International economy, and foUowed on from the 
unification of Germany, which disturbed the balance of power established 
Colantes Established 
188 
28 
138 
17 
Colonies Terminated 
41 
95 
53 
127 
* The table is constmcted in terms of legal categoríes because the establishment or 
termínation of colonies does not convcy changes in political and constitutional status between 
metropolitan govemments and their empires overseas (Darwin, 1980). 
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at the Treaty of Vienna and intensified competition for markets, raw 
materials, bases and possessions overseas, particularly in África but also 
in Asia and the Pacific '^*. 
TABLE2 
Colonial Territory held by Europea» Powers, 1878-1933 
(in millions of square kms) 
Britain 
France 
Portugal 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Germany 
Italy 
1826 
9.0 
0.1 
0.5 
1.2 
0.4 
— 
— 
1878 
24.9 
4.9 
2.2 
2.1 
1.0 
0.5 
0.0 
1913 
29.5 
11.5 
2.2 
2.1 
0.8 
3.5 
2.5 
1933 
31.6 
12.4 
2.2 
2.1 
0.8 
0.5 
2.8 
SouRCE: Clark (1936), pp. 23-28, for 1878, 1913 and 1933 and Bairoch (1989), p. 105, 
for 1826 only. 
During the scramble for África, the annexation of territory in Asia and 
the occupation of islands in the Pacific, far more colonial territory and 
populations passed under the control of European states than the more 
modest rate of acquisition that went on between 1815 and the British 
occupation of Egypt in 1882. FoUowing that defíning event an upswing 
occurred when the number of powers involved in Europe's new wave of 
imperialism widened not merely when the govemments of Portugal (and 
even Spain) revived their interest in África but because other European 
States (Germany, Italy and Belgium) with no real traditions of colonialism 
found it poÜtically expedient to build up empires overseas. Meanwhile, 
the inexorable march of Russian armies overland towards Asia and the 
Pacific incorporated more and more land, natural resources and populations 
into the Romanov Empire. That march had commenced in Muscovy in 
the 1560s and by 1914 had created the largest contiguous territorial empire 
in the worid ^'^. 
Nevertheless expansión overseas (and overland) came virtually to a cióse 
with the outbreak of destructive warfare among the great powers, 1914-18 
Clark(1936), pp. 5-6. 
White(1997). 
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-a conjuncture which marked the beginning of the end of fíve centuries 
of European imperialism. Only for a brief interlude within that long history 
had it seemed to make economic and political sense for European statesmen 
to consider uncoupling metropolitan economies from formal ties with their 
empires. Between 1846 and 1914, on the context of a viable and sustainable 
International order for the conduct of great power politics and more or 
less peaceable conditions for transnational economic relations, the costs, 
as well as the benefits of empires, could be added up, analysed and 
marshalled to inform national and International debates concerned with 
the commercial and imperial policies pursued by major European powers "^. 
Not surprisingly, and because the London govemment ruled over the 
very largest of global empires, (and which continued, moreover, upon an 
apparently irresistible course of territorial acquisition throughout the free 
trade era) the economies of imperialism became a more central component 
of the British discourse in political economy than it did on the continent. 
That discourse, which traced its antecedents back before the American 
War of Independence, 1776-83, was pursued seriously throughout the 
liberal free trade period and has recently been revived in the writings of 
economic and other historians of the United Kingdom. It is in effect a 
historiography concerned basically to evalúate and measure linkages 
between imperialism and the relative decline of the metropolitan economy. 
For that purpose a matrix of national accounts have been used by British 
historians to analyse connexions between the empire and the macro 
economic growth of the home economy which include: balance of payments 
data, estimates of retums received from private capital invested in colonies 
and dominions overseas, emigration and the allocation of taxes levied upon 
metropolitan society for purposes of developing and preserving the security 
of the realm and its possessions overseas as a composite political unit. 
In theory the scale and significance of linkages (operating through trade, 
capital and labour flows and exp)enditures by metropolitan govemments 
on defence and other imperial objectives) could be defined, quantified 
and assessed in terms of their impact upon the long term growth of any 
European economy. Less direct connexions flowing from an «imperial 
element» in the formulation of a «theoretically separable» and «ostensibly 
domestic» set of fiscal, monetary and strategic policies are usually 
discemible but hardly quantifiable. While those more subtle influences 
shaped by the «infiltration» of an imperial dimensión into national cultures. 
"• Porter(1968). 
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institutions, consumen preferences and politics, continué to elude 
measurement and simply promote relevant debates in the ongoing appraisal 
üf European empires. 
Alas, a comprehensive data set including: exports of commodities and 
serv'ices, outflows of capital, migrations of people (human capital), 
allocations of taxes and subsidies from several European economies to 
their empires; as well as reverse inflows of imports, capital interest and 
profits, remittances and transfers on govemment account has not (and 
for several of these flows probably could not) be constructed. 
Shares of commodity exports and imports sold to and purchased from 
several European empires seems to be the only indicator currently available 
to compare the economic significance of empires down to 1914. 
TABLE3 
Approximate Shares ofDomestic Commodity Exports delivered 
hy European Economies to their Empires (%) 
^to. 
Britain 
France 
Spain 
Portugal 
HoUand 
Germany 
Italv 
Belgium 
Late 18th Century 
53 
22 
38 
46 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Mid Vnh Century 
26 
10 
21 
2 
9 
— 
— 
— 
Yíarly 20th Century 
35 
13 
6 
15 
6 
Less than 1 
2 
1 
I929-Í4 
42 
24 
3 
Soi.RCKS; from several authors referenccd included in this volume. The Brilish ratio 
refers to 1789-90 and incluJes exports to the United States which had formally achicved 
independcnce in 1783. The figures for 1929-34 are from Clark (1936). Empires includes: 
colorúes, dominions and dependcncies. 
Apart from commodity imports tabulations of other indicators required 
to gauge the full range of economic connexions are not accessible. 
Nevertheless, a reading of our case studies will reveal that the macro 
economic significance of empire for the rise, growth and decline of the 
British economy remained far greater and persisted for longer than it did 
for any other nation in Europe with the possible exception of Portugal. 
By comparison the loss of colonies in Southern America, which severely 
curtailed the involvement of the Spanish economy with empire after 1824, 
may have had beneficial effects upon Spain's rate of economic growth. 
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Although the Spanish State retained and renewed its commitment to its 
remaining colonies for several decades in the 19th century, any potential 
for gains from colonialism dwindled to insignifícance after further losses 
of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines- to the United States in 1898. 
Since the economic consequences of these losses were small, we may infer 
that the gains from their retention over the 19th century were of comparable 
significance. In the twentieth century Spanish colonies consisted of a small 
amount of territory in north and central África but the nation's long tradition 
of imperialism left a malign heritage of protectionism, nationalism and 
militarism, which did so much to prolong the retardation of the Spanish 
economy until the 1960s. 
French aspirations to rival Britain as the hegemonic, imperial power 
suffered serious sctbacks in the wars of 1756-63 and 1793-1815. Thereafter 
France regained ground and assets in África and Asia and over the century 
to 1914 rebuilt an empire which in área, natural resources and population, 
ranked a poor second to Britain. In terms of macro economic significance 
the post 1815 French empúre probably contributed even less to domestic 
economic growth than the empires of Holland and Portugal. Furthermore, 
neither the Italian, Germán, ñor perhaps the Belgium empires lasted long 
enough or included sufficient cultivable land, labour, natural resources or 
other opportunities for exploitable investment to have exercised anything 
other than the short term, minor (and almost certainly negative) impacts 
on the rate and pattern of economic growth achieved by economies who 
entered Europe's imperial venture only in its final phase from 1882 to 
1903. 
For the majority of European economies (and particularly for Italy, 
Germany and Belgium) but also for other states which had retained rather 
small and economically insignificant territories and populations overseas, 
the economic case for any involvement in late imperialism now lacks all 
credibility. Even at the time the economic case for imperialism looked 
spurious simply because the share of national wealth and f)opulations 
included within the boundaries of several European empires was small 
and any potential losses of national income (emanating even in worst case 
scenarios from disengagement) could only have been small. 
Neither modern conceptual categories (like national income and 
national wealth) ñor other relevant statistics were available to 
contemporaries who still managed to argüe about the burdens and potential 
profitability of empires. Furthermore, liberal observations that the overall 
scale of imperial enterprise had become rather tangential for Italian, 
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Spanish, Portuguese and French domestic economic progress, carried less 
currency for Dutch and even less conviction for British debates- if only 
because the material gains from empire looked tangible and visible for 
certain regions, industries and for politically powerful groups within those 
two kingdoms. 
Furthermore, even the post hoc evaluations of the macro costs and 
benefits derived from the retention of empires during the era of free trade 
specialisation and increasing integration among European countries cannot 
be conducted without recourse to several contestable counterfactual 
assumptions. In short the economic grounds and assumptions for 
Cobdenite/Hobsonian antipathies to empire needed then and now to be 
spelled out and discussed country by country. 
The papers here attempt to do just that and our essay proposes simply 
to summarise the major assumptions, the methods and the counterfactuals 
that explicitly, or implicitly, formed the scaffolding for an exercise in 
comparative imperial history. As usual more research should be undertaken. 
Many questions are not answered and several will probably remain 
unanswerable. Nevertheless, the taxonomic separation and classification 
of the major problems to be addressed became clearer during the 
preliminary conference in Madrid. 
Firstly, the precise economic significance of empires for the 
development of any national economy is best exposed by a three-way 
comparison of: the relative scales (ratios) of commodity, factor and fiscal 
flows within the home economy compared to flows to and from the 
domestic economy and its empire and contrasted with flows between the 
home country and the rest of the intemational economy. In every case 
considered here interconnexions through (i) the export and import of goods 
and Services, (ii) migration, (iii) net flows of investible funds, interest, profits 
and dividends and other economic links with the rest of the world economy 
look immeasurably more important than links with national empires. Even 
for Britain (the European economy most interconnected with its colonies 
and dominions overseas) economic relations with countries and territories 
outside the empire remained more important by a large, if diminishing, 
margin throughout the long nineteenth century, 1815-1914. In short for 
any European country intemational economic linkages, including those with 
the empires of rival powers, were always far more significant. 
Just how important their empires might have been for the development 
of particular national economies implicitly raises the counterfactual question 
of how and to what extent the interconnexions could have changed if 
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European states had relinquished political control over their colonies and 
dependencies sometime before 1914? 
For each country the scale of these interconnexions varied from minor 
to small. Possible scenarios for each and every case would be too detailed 
to summarise here. Probable sequences can only be discussed by historians 
with the empirical knowledge required to engage in plausible conjectures 
about paths and patterns of national (including colonial) economic histories 
that they understand. For example, pessimistic scenarios genérate assertions 
that: colonies granted independencc could have fallen into anarchy (a 
popular British perception of India in Victorian times); that independencc 
would have led to higher tariffs against exports from the metropolitan and 
other European traders; that colonies uncoupled from imperial rule could 
orJy have developed more slowly and thereby lowered overall levéis of 
world trade. 
Some combination of protectionism and slower growth seemed to be 
a more realistic and fruitful conjecture to pursue than diré warnings of 
relapses into anarchy and prolonged delinking from world trade. On this 
assumption a paradigm paper by Edelstein offers estimates that the short 
term decline in national income that might counterfactually, have followed 
from loss of political control over the very largest of European empires 
-the British empire. His estimates come to somewhere between 1.6 per 
cent and 4.3 per cent of G.N.P. for 1870 and 4.9 per cent to 6.5 per 
cent for 1913. These ratios are not small but they depend upon a specified 
set of assumptions about tariff rates, elasticities of demand and levéis of 
trade that might have been obtained in the absence of British rule and 
influence. They are, moreover, upper bound numbers because the resources 
used to produce exports for the colonies are assumed to have zero 
opportunity cost and are not reallocated in Edelstein's heuristic model to 
their second best altemative uses *'. Yet the example of Spain after the 
loss of Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico in 1898 shows how quickly 
Spanish exporters recovered from the sudden loss of protected markets. 
There is no reason to suppose that the more flexible and efficient export 
industries of Britain, France and Germany (even Portugal) would not have 
adjusted even more readily to a «phased withdrawal» from empire or any 
involvement in imperial enterprise over the latter half of the long nineteenth 
century. 
By that time, it is, also difficult to find examples of imports from 
European empires that could not be procured from non imperial sources 
" Edelstein (1994) 
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at similar and, for several éxploited' European populations, at even lower 
pnces. To sum up: the hypothetical but plausible estimates for the net 
benefits derived by the British and other economies from trade with empires 
suggest that after mid century the net benefits could not have been other 
than «small», possibly below 2 per cent of G.N.P. If that argument can 
be sustained for Britain, it foUows that during the liberal order, the gains 
from trade accruing to European economies with a far more limited 
involvcment with empires (especially Italy, Germany and Bclgium) but also 
Portugal, Spain, France and even IloUand can be represented as negligible 
and dispensable. This conclusión does not preclude interesting variations 
across countries and through time or deny that colonial markets and sources 
of supply could be important, as our case studies show, for some European 
regions (e.g. for rural Castile) and for some cities (c.g. Barcelona and 
Amsterdam) and for particular industries, (such as Catalán cotton textiles, 
Portuguese shipping and for ship building, and textile production in 
HoUand). The multiplication of local examples docs not aggregate, however, 
to macro economic significance. 
But if, as proponents of empire insisted, the diffusion and maintenance 
of a liberal international economic order depended on the Pax Britannica, 
which in turn rested upon the survival of the British Empire, then the 
gains from trade flowing from the survival of British imperialism could 
have been correspondingly greater. They could be even larger if that other 
counterfactual (deployed by imperialists at the time to strengthen the 
economic case for the extensión and maintenance of European empires) 
is accepted; namely, that local economies in Asia, África and Southern 
America would have been less developed and more delinked from 
international trade and specialisation in the absence of colonial rule. But 
writing after decolonisation, historians from those continents are more 
inclined to entertain the opposite counterfactual. 
Several assumptions emerged as implicit in the debate concerned with 
the interconnexions between international and imperial trade and they 
surfaced again in discussions about costs and benefits of migration of 
European labour to and the investment of capital in Europe's empires. 
For labour, the British empire acted as a safety valve and source of upward 
mobility for ambitious and potentially unruly Celts from Scotland and 
Ireland. As places of settlement for underemployed agricultural labour, 
Italian and Spanish colonies turned out, however, to be disappointing 
venues for emigration and large scale migration to Cuba only occurred 
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after the colony became independent ^^ . Retum flows of remittances seem 
to be higher from migrants employed in the United States and independent 
republics in Southern America. Two features of these intemational factor 
flows now seem reasonably clear. Firstly, neither colonies ñor dominions 
emerge from British, Dutch, French and Italian statistics as particularly 
well favoured destinations for emigrants or for the flow of savings placed 
outside their home economies by British or Dutch, let alone by French, 
Portuguese and Spanish investors. 
Secondly, there is now a body of data and case studies in business 
history that effectively refutes Marxist assertions that by the late nineteenth 
century imperial outlets had become necessary to stave off diminishing 
returns to capital invested within Western Europe. It also undermines the 
assumption that «supemormal» profits accrued to funds placed within safer 
imperial locations, where, in theory at least, colonial power could have 
been deployed to secure «exploitative» rates of profit for European 
capitalists. Tabulations for British, French and Dutch stocks of capital 
invested overseas in the early twentieth century do not display any marked 
preference on the part of European investors for imperial compared to 
foreign locations. Although there are examples of extremely high profits 
accruing to risky prívate ventures in several European empires, modal rates 
of return on either portfolio and/or direct investment do not seem (on 
admittedly limited evidence) to have been extraordinary. 
Meanwhile, the British debate that the massive outflows of investible 
funds allocated to the rest of the world (including its empire) operated 
to retard the structural adjustments required for the long term growth 
of domestic industry has been vigorous if inconclusive. At very least there 
is now a presumption for the United Kingdom (and also perhaps for 
Portugal, HoUand and France) that significant shares of both public and 
privately funded capital formation undertaken to acquire, develop and 
defend imperial economies overseas generated sub optimal returns for most 
if not all European economies. 
Hobson's prediction, made as early as 1902, that investment at home 
(or in independent countries outside European empires) would tum out 
to be a superior allocation of capital for a nation's economic growth seems 
unequivocally clear for Germany and Italy whose imperial assets were 
expropriated without compensation following defeats in the two world wars 
of the twentieth century. Spanish property in Cuba, the Philippines and 
" Sánchez-Alonso (1995). 
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Puerto Rico was not seized by the United States in 1898 and the immediate 
and measurable losses from defeat in that conflict do not appear to have 
been particularly large. Although it has been argued that the long term 
political repercussions of the war turned out to be serious for Spain's 
economic development over the present century. 
After 1873 the taxes levied to retain, expand and defend the British, 
French, Portuguese and Dutch possessions overseas began to increase at 
rates which worried govemments and strengthened the case made by liberal 
critics that the costs of empires to metropolitan taxpayers may well have 
been steadily exceeding the benefíts that they received by discernable and 
growing margins. 
Despite an abundance of budgetary records, for most states the fiscal 
burdens of empire are not simple to define, amenable to measurement 
and above all are not easy to relate (in any unambiguous way) to 
compensating streams of economic, psychic and strategic benefits accruing 
to metropolitan economies and societies over time. 
Although budgetary sources often prove rather intractable in use, annual 
outlays made by metropolitan govemments on behalf of their empires can 
usually be estimated. Very large shares of public expenditure for this 
purpose consisted (not surprisingly) of the military and naval costs of 
imperial conquest, pacification, law and order and defence of colonies and 
dominions from threats of enemy attack. Initial or threshold costs of 
acquiring territory, bases, populations and resources overseas usually appear 
in national fiscal data as once and for all outlays on warfare (e.g. upon 
Algerian, Maori and Ethiopian wars). Pacification could, however, take 
niany years and the opportunity costs of manpower and other resources 
«used up» in conquest are usually regarded as bygones by govemments 
prone to draw lines under past records of profligacy by the state. 
Unfortunately they appear all too seldom on post hoc balance sheets for 
European Empires drawn up by historians. Unless expenditures by 
govemments upon conquest had been funded by borrowing, they matured 
in official perceptions into «sunk» costs and have disappeared from view. 
Except that is for the British case where the presence throughout the liberal 
era of a extraordinarily large national debt with massive debt servicing 
obligations (absorbing 56 per cent of tax revenues in the 1820s, falling 
to 16 per cent over the first decade of the twentieth century) served to 
remind statesmen (and historians) how costly the acquisition and extensión 
of the British empire had been. Thus and while any ratio cited would 
be somewhat arbitrary, there is clearly a case for adding some share of 
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annual governmental expenditures on debt servicing to the familiar 
calculations for the fiscal costs of acquiring, defending and developing 
empires overseas. 
Even «current outlays» on empire are not, however, classified clearly 
enough in published government accounts. For example, departmental 
expenditures are seldom separated into their domestic and colonial 
components. Figures for the latter are «hidden» away under several kinds 
of official headings that implicitly recirculate metropolitan taxes in order 
to subsidise territories overseas. Although acceptable assumptions can be 
made in order to expose allocations for empire, the problems of reclassifying 
the military and naval expenditures made by European states into outlays 
«required» for the defence of the metrópolis and its overseas trade on 
the one hand, and expenditures incurred for the protection of possessions, 
located beyond the borders of national states on the other, are not easily 
surmounted. What seems clear (wáth the possible and partial exceptions 
of India and Indonesia) is that the economies and populations of nearly 
all European colonies and dominions contributed very littlc towards the 
costs of their own defence from extemal aggression or from internal 
insurrection. Furthermore, in several cases (e.g. Italy and Portugal) a 
scrutiny of budgetary accounts reveáis that the taxes levied upon local, 
indigenous populations and economies covered only fractions of all public 
expenditures incurred for civil administration and investment in 
infra-structural faciüties and services required for the govemance of 
Europe's colonies and dominions. 
Net transfers of tax revenues from the metropole to empires overseas 
for non-military purposes are, however, more measurable than expenditures 
on the armies and navies, incurred strictly for the defence of colonies and 
dominions. And the attempt by Davis and Huttenback to provide estimates 
for the «feasible sums» that colonies and dominions might have allocated 
for their own defence (if they had been granted full independence) is not 
considered to be a convincing exercise in counterfactual history because 
«normal» levéis of defence expenditure by autonomous states seem 
impossible to define ^'. Although inferences could be drawn about costs 
for Spanish taxpayers from the post independence outlays on armies and 
navies by the independent govemments of South America between 
1825-1914. On the other hand, the sequence of late nineteenth negotiations 
between the British government and the governments of its dominions 
" Davis and Huttenback (1986). 
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suggests, there can be no presumption that if, say, Australia, Canadá, New 
Zealand and South África had assumed full responsibility for funding their 
own armies and navies that the burdens on British taxpayers would have 
fallen by commensurate amounts. 
Expenditures by the British govemment on troops, sailors, weapons, 
equipment, fortifications, bases and ships located outside the kingdom and 
its home waters, might, in theory, be divisible into the proportions required 
for the defence of the realm and its trade on the one hand and allocations 
for the protection of its dominions and colonies on the other. In practice 
that distinction became more blurred in the perceptions of statesmen, 
admiráis and generáis responsible for strategic planning. Any such división 
will be difficult, moreover, to transform into estimates that might 
approximate to the fiscal barden Ixirne by metropolitan taxpayers purely 
for imperial defence. 
As long ago as 1936 Grover Clark produced the data to show that 
annual expenditures by the British, French, Italian, Germán and Japanese 
governments on the formation of capital in their colonies and upon the 
armies and navies required for the protection of imperial commerce 
exceeded by a large margin any possible gains from imperial trade. In his 
calculations, Clark assumed that the expenditures by the French 
govemment on the military and naval capacity required to protect 
commerce with its empire would be proportionate to the share of total 
French trade conducted with the colonies between 1894 and 1934. To 
that sum he added direct expenditures by the French govemment on civil 
expenditures and showed that total outlays funded by taxpayers amounted 
to 21% of total colonial trade '^'. Offer complicates and lengthens the 
balance sheet by arguing that the «voluntary» contributions of manpower 
and other resources made by the dominions and colonies towards the 
defence of the realm and the British empire in the course of four years 
of warfare against Germany and the central powers, 1914-18, represented 
some recognition that the metropole had borne the burdens of imperial 
defence in peacetime and could not be expected to meet the entire cost 
of repelling the threat of Germán aggression in wartime " . Another way 
of expressing the same reservation is (as Cain suggests) to represent the 
costs of acquiring and maintaining an empire as annual insurance premiums 
incurred against the risk of a breakdown in the international economic 
" Clark (1936). 
" Offer (1993). 
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order and that Britain (and France) collected payment on these premia 
during two world wars, 1914-18 and 1939-45. 
Loyalty and patriotism to the motherland matured inte priceless assets 
but this acceptable argument dees not mean that the empire somehow 
carried a «crucial» or «disproportionate» share of the costs incurred to 
defeat the Kaisereich, or that wartime contributions from the colonies and 
dominions somehow in clear economic terms compensated for the higher 
levéis of taxation im{X)sed on British (and French) citizens for imperial 
defence for many decades before 1914. Furthermore, the long and 
persistent obfuscation of any clear distinction between the defence of the 
realm and the defence of its imperial assets overseas led to a context in 
which for several decades before the war, Britain's strategic planning 
remained too detached from involvement with the balance of power on 
the mainland of Europe. British statesmen failed to forge the diplomatic 
alliances and to build up the military forcé required to deter Germán 
aggression. On this kind of open-ended historical accountancy, British (and 
to a more limited extent the French) preoccupations with empire overseas 
can be represented as failures of the liberal imagination, which perhaps 
added up to the most costly strategic error in European history. 
Such arguments will run and run. Meanwhile, it is surely pointless to 
deny that the extensión and defence of European empires against threats 
of external aggression and intemal subversión cost metropolitan taxpayers 
real money; and that throughout Europe their burdens increased following 
the unification of Germany in 1871. The incidence of such taxes was not, 
moreover, calibrated to fall upon the incomes of taxpayers who derived 
most of the material gains from state expenditures on possessions overseas. 
All in all the fiscal costs of European empires are not easily defined or 
measured because public goods, like defence, diplomacy and strategic 
planning, cannot be accommodated into the framework of cost-benefit 
analysis, as normally applied to the evaluation of private and public 
investment decisions. There seem to be several unknowns, too many 
unpriceable extemalities and strategic ramifications that are too widespread 
for the categories to contain measurable, as distinct from plausible, 
propositions about the allocations of metropolitan taxes for purposes of 
acquiring and maintaining European empires. 
Nevertheless, cost-benefit metaphors still provide some useful 
vocabulary that helps us order the argument about fiscal policies and 
prompts historians to measure and compare what is quantifiable. For 
example, it now seems clear that in per capita terms, British taxpayers paid 
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considerably more for the defence of the realm and its large empire overseas 
than the citizens of all other great powers and potential econoniic rivals. 
Quantified in terms of specified' shares of gross national product allocated 
by the state for the extensión, defence and development of empire, Britain 
again would surely be at the very top of European league tables? This 
may not mean that the British economy and British taxpayers carried 
«excessively high» burdens for national and imperial defence. John M. 
Hobson's recently constructed estimates suggest that the «military 
extraction ratios» (overall defence expenditures as a share of net national 
product) for the period, 1870-1913, were some two percentage points 
higher for Russia and one percentage point larger for France and that 
the British ratio stood on a par with ratios for Germany, Italy and Austria 
but had risen to more than three times the extraordinarily low ratio (0.9 
per cent) maintained by the United States after its costly civil war '^. 
Although resources could certainly be wasted in futile imperial conflicts 
and squandered in unprofítable diplomatic incidents (e.g. the wars between 
the United States and Spain in 1898 and Russia and Japan in 1904 as 
well as the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911), before 1914 the volume 
of resources allocated year after year by European govemments specifícally 
and clearly for the maintenance and defence of empires could not have 
constituted anything other than smallish shares of their national products. 
Represented in the most unfavourable light as a lost opportunities for 
investment within metropolitan economies, the shares of domestic capital 
formation hypothetically foregone must have been relatively large in the 
British case. Thus in 1902 J. A. Hobson was addressing a signifícant item 
of public expenditure that seemed to him profitable to reallocate for 
domestic purposes. It would certainly be interesting (if and when the fiscal 
costs of European empires are properly added up) to compare the amounts 
as estimated with gross domestic capital formation and to calcúlate their 
hypothetical impact on growth rates of real national incomes. Even for 
the United Kingdom could the scale of potentially negative effects have 
been anything other than economically signifícant for its longer term 
growth? 
To sum up: between 1846-1914 European powers extended, 
maintained and defended empires «on the cheap». A phased withdrawal 
from formal rule would not, as radicáis at the time suggested, have resulted 
in diminished gains from trade, lower retums on investment overseas, or 
'" Hobson (1997). 
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any closure of opportunities for emigration. Some but perhaps no sharp 
reductions in tax burdens might have occurred. In a free trade world 
integrating factor markets and stable arrangements for intemational 
payments, empires had become economically irrelevant for the development 
of Europe. Paradoxically, empires were growing and colonial disputes 
certainly played their part in the siide towards the most costly war in the 
continent's history. 
Global Warfare, Neo Mercantilism and the Reintegration 
ofEuropean Empires from 1914 to the Treaty o/Rome 
Unfortunately, the relevance of empires grew far stronger over the half 
century between the outbreak of global warfare among the great powers 
in 1914 and the formation of the European Economic Community in 1958. 
The Great War, which effectively brought European expansión overseas 
to an end, can be represented as another significant conjuncture in the 
history of imperialism. Four years of destruction ended with the Treaties 
of Versailles and Sevres, which (like the Treaty of Vienna a century earlier) 
redistributed the provinces and colonies of defeated nations {this time 
Germany and Turkey) among the victors, France, Britain and Italy; 
dismembered the former Habsburg Empire and created the independent 
republics of Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia from territories 
of the former Romanov Empire. 
In 1919 the victorious European states assumed responsibility for larger 
empires and dependencies at a time when the intemational economic order 
began to move rapidly away from the imregulated arrangements for 
commodity trade, capital movements, technology diffusion, labour 
migration and transfers of payments across frontiers that had characterised 
intemational commerce for several decades before 1914. Of course, 
«tendencies» towards «new protectionism» had been observed in the laws 
effecting foreign trade and payments promulgated by several governments 
between 1876 and 1914. Almost everywhere, including Britain, lobbies and 
ideologies, worked to undermine the liberal order that had prometed 
integration and more efficient intemational economic relations for three 
decades after 1846. Although free trade existed onJy as an «untried utopia» 
and political constraints on flows of commodities, services, capital, labour 
and technology around the world economy certainly increased over the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century, in general tariffs and other controls 
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remained bounded enough to allow for the continued expansión of 
international commerce and factor mobility right down to the outbreak 
of war in 1914 " . Indeed the years 1899-1913 witnessed an upswing in 
the growth of trade, capital flows and migration that was only surpassed 
in scalc and intensity by the famous, long boom, 1948-73, that formed 
the economic background to decolonisation after the Second World War. 
Before the Great War opportunities to trade and invest within the 
international economy as a whole continued to be relatively unconstrained 
and economic arguments for closer imperial integration that emerged even 
before the end of the nineteenth centur)', did not seem compelling enough 
to shift national, commercial policies in radically new directions. For more 
than a decade after la fin de siecle, the appeal of empire looks more atavistic 
and xenophobic than material. 
Unfortunately, the Great War pushed almost all European economies 
towards autarky, constricted the political boundaries of commodity and 
factor markets and reintroduced entirely serious military considerations into 
the discourse about the costs and benefits of empires. That occurred 
bccause during and in the wake of war, sales of surpluses, the procurement 
of food, raw materials and military goods, the recruitment of manpower 
from protected and secure sources of supply provided by colonies had 
become «strategic necessities». 
Colonial contributions to the metropolitan war effort cannot have 
accounted for more than a fraction of the resources allocated by the 
victorious alliances of Britain, Russia, America, France and other European 
powers to defeat Germany and the central powers in the First World War. 
Nevertheless, wars on that scale are not easily factored out of or into 
economic assessments of empire. At very least, the course, costs and 
consequences of the Great War altered European perceptions and 
parameters within which the economies of empires came to be discussed 
and assessed. First and foremost ideological and popular support for 
strengthening imperial connexions became far stronger as a result of bonds 
forged during four to five years of shared sacrifices for the defence of 
mother countries. Ties with kith and kin and an already deepening sense 
of responsibiiity towards «our» people and territories overseas all intensified 
in wartime. Secondly, the war disrupted intra-European trade and factor 
flows and promoted both moves towards autarky across countries and led 
to greater degrees of reliance on imperial trade and investment among 
'' Williamson(1996). 
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those European nations (Britain, France, Belgiunn, HoUand, Italy, Spain 
and Portugal) who controlled altemative possibilities for trade within the 
frameworks of political security, economic protection and reguJation 
provided by their colonies, dependencies and dominions. Thirdly the 
enormous costs incurred by European economies to mobilise for war and 
to demobilise for peace, the massive destruction of capital assets and the 
lost generations of dead and disabled workmen amounted to a sum roughly 
equivalent to four to five times Europe's national output for 1913 '^*. Even 
on the most favourable assumptions about prospects for renewed growth 
after the war, losses of that magnitude would have taken a generation 
to make up. More rapid rates of recovery often depended upon importing 
capital goods, raw materials and skilled manpower, which rendered foreign 
trade and/or capacities to borrow on intemational money markets even 
more important after than they had been before the war. 
That long and expensive conflict depleted Europe's stocks of physical 
and human capital and seriously dislocated the system of intemational trade 
and payments upon which investment and future growth depended. For 
many years after 1918 intemational economic relations continued to be 
afflicted by the consequences of the Versailles Treaty, by state controls 
enacted to wage war and above all by the malign legacies of financial 
strategies pursued by governments to fund massive expenditures on their 
armed forces between 1914-18. For example (and while taxes p)er head 
had more than doubled in real terms) European states borrowed most 
of the money they needed from their banks. Thus the problems of how 
to squeeze inflation out of the system and how to bring national price 
levéis and paper currencies back into some kind of sustainable relationship 
with one another emerged as the major preoccupation of statesmen and 
central bankers in the post war years. Their diffículties were compounded 
by the conjoined problems of inter-allied debts and Germán reparations. 
Political disagreements about the status of these debts led to recrimination 
among former allies (as well as deep resentment in Germany), which 
complicated the already diffícult task of reconstmcting an intemational 
trade and payments system. 
War also reinforced tendencies to protectionism, latent but already 
evident before 1914. For example, the Versailles Treaty provided for the 
dismemberment of three multinational free trade empires and the creation 
of several new states in Europe with autonomous control over tariffs and 
'" 0'Brien(1996), 
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foreign trade. Cut off by blockades and exorbitant transportation costs 
from supplies of manufactured imports, a long list of countries embarked 
upon programmes of accelerated import substitution. At the cióse of 
hostilities when govemments found their young industries under threat 
from renewed international competition, they raised tariff barriers '^. Self 
sufficiency in foodstuffs and raw materials, which also became a matter 
of national security in wartime, proved politically difficult to reverse once 
peace retumed. 
While it would be impossible to predict how the international order 
might have developed without the catastrophe of the Great War, from 
the vantage point of that boom in the world economy, from 1899-1914, 
there would seem to be no need to be other than optimistic about future 
prospects. Growth rates for production and foreign trade, for migration 
and capital flows across frontiers, had attained record levéis. European 
economies seemed to be adjusting to the realities of international 
competition, including the appearance of Japan but more importantly to 
the rapid rise of the United States, which as early as the 1890s had emerged 
as the hegemonic industrial power of the twentieth century. 
Europe's inevitable decline in relative terms became much more of 
a problem after a major war which had witnessed massive destruction of 
human and physical capital, the exhaustion and pillage of the Germán 
and Austrian economies and the economic chaos which attended revolution 
in Russia. Meanwhile, wartime shortages had promoted the more rapid 
rise of several new industrial economies: notably the United States but 
also Ganada and Japan and several economies in South America. Called 
upon to face discontinuous jumps in the competitive position of American 
industry at a time of disorder in international economic relations, 
heightened levéis of protection and recovery from the most costly war since 
Napoleón proved in the event to be too difficult for European capitalism 
and liberalism. By the 1930s the system had succumbed to depression, 
communism, fascism and to the implementation of programmes for imperial 
integration. 
Such programmes, forged during the war and evolving throughout the 
1920s, came towards the top of political agendas in the wake of the Great 
Depression and after the failures of statesmen and central bankers to 
reconstruct a viable international economic order, free from inflation and 
with stable rates of exchange, with modérate levéis of protection and 
Capic(1994). 
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minimaJ interference by govemments with flows of commodities, capital 
and labour across frontiers. Thus for several European economies (Britain, 
France, Portugal, Spain and Italy but not for Holland) imperial integration 
appeared as a viable substitute for a more open international order at 
a time when the growth of world commerce had slowed down and trade 
across frontiers became afflicted with degrees of risk and instabiüty not 
witnessed since the early nineteenth century. 
Then for the third (or perhaps the fourth time if the thirty years of 
religious conflict, 1618-48) is included in our chronology) another world 
war and its aftermath during the 'forties led to the final conjuncture in 
the long history of economic interconnexions between European states and 
their colonies, assets and possessions overseas. Most of the short term 
changes in nature and scale of these connexions that flowed from the 
Second World War, 1939-45, (and the post war period of recovery) 
mirrored the experience of the Great War and its aftermath. 
For example, Spain and Portugal had remained neutral during both 
world wars. But during the great depression in the 1930s and the period 
of warfare and recovery from destructive warfare that afflicted the 
international economy in the 1940s, their dependence on colonies as 
markets and as sources of supply for food, raw materials, minerals and 
fuel, increased as markedly as anywhere else in Europe. Although Spain's 
dependence on empire was much less than Portugal's, Franco's military 
rebellion which plunged Spain into civil war and isolation was launched 
from (and during its early stages armed with the aid of hard currency 
provided by) Spanish colonies in África. 
Between 1939-45 the manpower and resources of the entire British 
Empire were once again mobilised to defeat the armed forces of Germany, 
Japan, Austria, Italy and other axis powers on battlefields, airways and 
sea lañes in Europe, Asia, África and the Americas. Such assistance in 
times of grave national danger had always been deeply appreciated but 
it has not yet been measured in terms that might provide us with a precise 
idea of its economic magnitude. Meanwhile, the heritage and frequently 
revived memory of the empire's contribution to: victory in two world wars; 
the stabilisation of the home economy during periods of instability and 
depression between the wars; and to its recoveries after 1918 and again 
after 1945 evolved into omnipresent parts of the political culture informing 
and moulding strategic, monetary, fiscal and commercial policies pursued 
by successive British govemments between the wars and for several decades 
after 1945. 
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Imperial preferences, fiscal subsidies and exemptions, sterling áreas, 
commercial treaties, bilateral arrangements, programmes of aid and 
development and exchange agreements all became a much stronger and 
a steadily more constricting framework of «imperial» laws, rules and 
regulations within which the British economy operated after 1914. 
Responding in more or less similar ways to changes in the balance 
of power, to violent disruptions, to the liberal international economic order 
and to the scale and rapid rise of industrial might on the continent of 
North America, governments in France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Italy 
also embedded their domestic economies in treaties, regulations, 
agreements, regulations and monetary blocs designed to foster imperial 
integration. For some continental societies (notably France but also 
Belgium) the heritage of empire and the positive role played by their 
colonies in the defeat of Germany again formed part of popular sentiment 
in favour of «France outre mer». In other countries, especially Britain (but 
also Italy under Mussolini), pretensions to great power status were 
conceived to be dependent upon the possession of empire or upon the 
traditions and influence required to «line up» a commonwealth of states 
that had once been colonies. For long stretches of the 20th century the 
cultures and politics of imperialism reinforced strategic and economic 
pressures on European governments to intégrate with and to make the 
most of their empires. 
Meanwhile, the Cobdenite discourse in favour of free trade and for 
disengagement from empire faded but it did not die away. Indeed 
antipathies to empire embodied in classical liberalism became 
complemented by socialist doctrines with their sympathies for movements 
for colonial freedom that emerged in Asia, África and the Caribbean 
between the wars. Nevertheless, the post 1914 climate of hostility and 
suspicion among states, the depressed state of world trade and the almost 
universal trend towards the political regulation of international economic 
relations, all combined to lead goveming élites to conceive of empires as 
Solutions to their strategic problems and domestic economic difficulties. 
Cobdenite prescriptions for disengagement from empires became as remote 
from centres of power and policy as the sermons of socialists preaching 
for colonial freedom. 
For every set of national data that is available related to commodity 
trade, to the sale and purchase of services, to flows of investment and 
labour overseas, (as well as national surveys on the operation of monetary 
systems and payments), statistical and other evidence of closer integration 
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between metropolitan econotnies and their colonies and commonwealths 
overseas is unmistakeable. Of course, degrees of integration varied and 
was far less obvious in, say, the Dutch than the French case. Nevertheless, 
on most indicators, trends towards imperial integration (which had been 
initiated during the Great War) gained momentum during the world 
depression of the 193 Os and reached their apogee during and for roughly 
a decade after the Second World War, when a dislocated intemational 
economy and severe shortages of hard currencies (especially dollars) 
increased the dependence of European powers on their colonies and 
commonwealths. 
During more than four decades of civil war, neo mercantilism and 
instability, 1914-58, European states tumed (or perhaps in the long stream 
of history we should say returned?) to their colonies and dominions for 
strategic help and economic assistance. It could be argued that imperial 
options diverted the attention of statesmen away from the more difficult 
problem of reconstructing an intemational order. Nevertheless, there can 
be no doubt that the contributions of empires to the security of mother 
countries and to the stability and growth of metropolitan economies was 
perceived at the time (and has been represented by many historians ever 
since) as positive and significant. For long stretches of the twentieth century, 
as counterfactuals, Cobdenite and socialist prescriptions against empires 
looked increasingly unrealistic. 
Yet, and simply as a prelude to European decolonisation, the prolonged 
attempts at imperial reintegration still seems worth considering within the 
matrix of national accounts favoured by economists because that experience 
can only be represented as a second best and more costly solution to the 
problems created by war and to the dislocation of an intemational economic 
order that had functioned effectively for severa! decades before the First 
Worid War. 
For example, intra-imperial trade and flows of investment conducted 
within systems of preferential tariffs, currency blocs, multi-lateral bargainlng 
and political arrangements which all became prevalent for roughly forty 
years after 1914, always remained as sub-optimal solutions compared to 
open intemational trade. Such systems could certainly genérate some gains 
from exchange and specialisation. Imperial commerce does, moreover, 
represent an improvement on the dominant altemative of the period 
—national and regional tendencies towards autarky— particularly if 
colonies could be induced (or even forced) by metropolitan govemments 
to participate in exchanges on wider markets. Nevertheless, the benefits 
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derived from trade creation within imperial trading blocs are unlikely to 
have exceeded the costs of trade diversión, simply because disparities in 
political power among the various levéis of central and local authority that 
were included within European empires or commonwealths normally 
attempted to promote complementarity across economies, countervailed 
competition and maintained national and regional comparative advantages 
within historical and broadly static pattems of specialisation. As several 
of our national case studies reveal, more often than not systems of imperial 
preference operated to sustain traditional staple industries or segments of 
European agricultures that had lost comparative advantages to more 
efficient competitors from elsewhere in the world economy. At the same 
time some metropolitan populations (and especially French and Portuguese 
families) paid relatively high prices for the privilege of consuming food 
and raw materials from their colonies. Empires normally supported 
divergent but complementary forms of interregional trade. However 
politically constructed, as institutional frameworks for trade and 
specialisation, they could not become as efficient for European growth 
and development as customs unions and free trade áreas which sustained 
competition and lead to convergence and differentiated pattems of 
specialisation among economies that are geographically contiguous, 
culturally homogeneous and not too dissimilar in structures and levéis of 
industrial development. 
Unfortunately research in twentieth century business history has not 
yet produced the samples of case studies required to test the proposition 
that the observed reallocation of metropolitan investment towards imperial 
(compared to domestic and foreign) locations generated sub-optimal 
retums for European economies. Extraordinary rates of profit certainly 
accrued to some British, French, Dutch, Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese 
companies engaged in the prospecting and mining of minerals and crude 
oil. Cash crop plantations are another sector where European investors 
are perceived to have made supemormal profits. The numerous examples 
of favourable leases and other contracts and concessions for land and 
mineral rights, under which European owned companies operated for 
several decades after 1914, originated in political contexts of colonial 
governance and mandatory power. Nevertheless, comparable retums on 
investments in Asia, África and Southem America seem to have accmed 
to American, Swiss, Germán and other European companies and investors 
without the privileges (or the costs!) of formal imperial míe. There is (as 
yet) too litde evidence that colonial power was directly and systematically 
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used to secure «econotnic rents» for metropolitan capital placed in Europe's 
colonies, protectorales and dependencies. In the absence of hard statistics 
rates of profit eamed on such capital can still be plausibly represented 
as «normal» for investments of comparable risk located within the borders 
of sovereign European and/or foreign states. Furthermore, once indigenous 
movements for colonial freedom emerged as serious threats to colonial 
rule and the military and political capacities of European states to resist 
had been undermined, democratic antipathies towards empires, the risks 
(indeed the recorded losses) of European capital from violence and 
expropriation increased enormously. By mid century there were few places 
left where European capitalists could depend for long on colonial authorities 
to help them obtain «exploitative» rates of profit. With decolonisation 
under way, European governments concentrated upon securing 
compensation (often without success) for the fixed assets that their 
nationals lost through forced transfers and nationalisations of property that 
foUowed almost everywhere from the end of empires. Whatever the flows 
of psychic or strategic benefits might havc been there can be little doubt 
that the fiscal costs of maintaining imperial rule increased dramatically 
during and after the First World War. Burdens levied on metropolitan 
taxpayers to meet expenditures incurred by European states for the extemal 
defence, for the maintenance of intemal order and for the economic and 
social development of their colonies and protectorales went up and up. 
Furthermore, such burdens could not, moreover, be easily shared. For 
example, Britain's dominions continued to resist pressures to contribute 
a greater share towards the costs of imperial defence and mindful of the 
sacrifices that they had made during the First World War, London did 
not push that demand too hard. Meanwhile, the failure of the Treaty of 
Versailles to restore the balance of power in Europe and the predatory 
intentions of Germany, Italy and Japan towards the interests and empires 
of Britain, France, Holland and Portugal in África and Asia became ominous 
and maintained expenditures to deter threats from extemal aggression at 
relatively high levéis. British and French strategic planners became more 
and more aware than they had been before 1914 of the tensions involved 
between the defence of homelands in Europe and the protection of far 
flung possessions against attacks from such potentially effective antagonists 
as Germany and Italy in África and Japan in Asia and the Pacific. 
At the same time, and stimulated by Wilsonian ideáis of self 
determination, Marxist theories of exploitation and older European ideas 
of democracy, national movements for colonial freedom began to raise 
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the costs of maintaining ¡nternal order, particularly in India but also in 
África. Aftcr the foundaiion of the Lcague of Nations, «progressive» 
statesmen and colonial administrators saw European imperialism as entering 
a phase of responsibility for the constructive economic and social 
development of indigenous peoples. Ideas of trust, of mission, of mándate 
appeared and built upon older Christian traditions of paternalism towards 
backward and poorer peoples. Although colonial expenditures on 
infra-structural development and social welfare did not leap forward during 
the years of fiscal constraint thal followed the Great War, the sense that 
supranational responsibilities would inevitably cost European taxpayers 
more and more money, led to a new wave of questioning and writing 
on the thcme of Do Empires Pay? With the spread of democracy in Europe 
more people began to perceive and to vote on the assumption that they 
might not and a spate of reports by journalists and intellectuals exposing 
the costs, injustices and occasional brutalities of colonial rule strengthened 
doubts about the valué of the entire imperial enterprise. 
Decolonisation and the Malign Legacies ofEmpire 
Global warfare from 1939-45 postponed discussions about the 
economic valué of Europe's empires. In the event the Axis powers suffered 
total defeat and lost, without compensation, all the national assets acquired 
through expenditures on conquest followed by years or (as in the Italian 
case) decades of investment in: facilities for defence and intemal order, 
infrastructures, fixed capital formation in colonial agricultures, industry and 
Services and expenditures upon the acculturation, training and education 
required by local workforces in order to establish productive and stable 
commercial relationships between a metrópolis and colonies overseas. 
Neither Italy ñor Germany (ñor Japan) ever recouped more than a fraction 
of their investments in colonisation. There can be little doubt that, except 
perhaps in psychic terms, the accumulated material beneflts accruing to 
Italian, Germán (and Japanese societies) from their engagement with 
empires overseas fell short of the costs of conquest and investment in 
infrastructures by very large margins. Fortunately, their fiscal expenditures 
and public and prívate investments in colonies does not seem to have 
been massive and prolonged enough to have constrained their long term 
rates of economic grov^^h to any significant degree. 
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For other European countries, including France, HoUand, Belgium and 
Portugal, with deeper traditions of colonisation and cultures permeated 
by imperialism, tendencias towards closer integration of domestic and 
colonial economies overseas that had reappeared between the wars became 
even stronger and more popular and matured into one of the more malign 
political legacies of the Second World War *\ For example, the involvement 
of the French, Dutch and Portuguese states in fighting wars in order to 
reclaim and pacify their empires from indigenous nationalist movements 
in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Indo China, Indonesia, Congo, Angola, 
Mozambique and elsewhere outside Europe, tumed out to be futile and 
very expensive. When all the accounts come in and the expenditures upon 
a long series of late colonial rearguard actions fought by European armies 
and navies in África, Asia, the Middle East and the Pacific, will surely 
be represented by historians as costly mistakes and more than likely as 
«all costs and no benefíts». That conclusión will be reinforced when 
historians add to the malign legacy of the attempt at imperial renewal, 
quantifíed conjectures for the economic valué of metropolitan property 
destroyed and expropriated by nationalist movements, as well as the costs 
of the disorder and depression that invariably afflicted former colonial 
economies for many years after their armed struggles to «seize» 
independence. Algeria has now become simply the most dramatic case in 
point. 
Given the size of its empire, the United Kingdom decolonised more 
cheaply than other imperial powers. Furthermore, Britain had also drawn 
far more heavily than any other European nations upon the resources of 
its empire and commonwealth to defeat Germany and (through the sterling 
área) to assist the home economy to recover after the Second World War ^\ 
Nevertheless, the imperial contribution towards victory in Europe, the 
security of the realm and post war recovery needs to be compared with 
resources supplied to wage war by the kingdom itself, by Russia and other 
allies and above all by the United States. Although historians might regard 
any attempt to draw distinctions between imperial and national defence 
as moot, economists might realistically suggest that Britain's dominions 
and the colonies participated in a «virtual alliance» of quasi autonomous 
political units constructed and funded to protect their own independence 
and integrity against the predatory intentions of Germany and Japan. If 
HoUand (1985). 
DaTOÍn(1988), 
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this «economistic representation» is valid, then the imperial contribution 
need not be depicted without question as altruistic and economically 
important for the survival and continued development of Britain (or France) 
during the world wars of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the cultural 
legacy of imperialism which gave credence and support to repeatedly 
reasserted claims for the material signifícance of empire might at the end 
of the century be represented as an important and persistent constraint 
upon the adjustments required for the competitive vitality of the British 
economy. 
For example, the legacy of empire permeated the formulation of the 
kingdom's strategic fiscal, monetary and commercial policies in ways that 
retarded and hampered the adaptation of the economy to the realities of 
international power and competition after 1945 ''^. Only Portugal and, to 
a more limited extent, France seems to have been economically afflicted 
(and not to the same degree) by the cultural and political legacies of empire. 
How different and economically superior modem history might have 
turned out for Britain and the rest of imperial Europe if Cobden's and 
Hobson's recommendations for decoupling from empires had occurred in 
the late nineteenth rather than at the end of this turbulent century? 
PARTIV. RETROSPECTIVE AND SPECULATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
Meanwhile, the thrust of our essay has been concemed to qualify, 
indeed to challenge, the widespread perception that European economies 
made gains from conquest and colonisation in África, Asia and Southern 
America that were palpably signifícant for their long term development. 
Thus in conclusión it may be interesting to speculate why imperialism turned 
out to be less than profítable for several European states most actively 
and consistently involved in expansión and enterprise overseas. 
Since European governments together with prívate investors persisted 
with various forms of colonial rule on and off for nearly five centuries, 
it must be the case that they believed that their policies and actions would 
pay. With hindsight, our essays (which deal with outcomes and not with 
motivations, aspirations and perceptions) make the point that time and 
again statesmen, generáis, admiráis, projectors, entrepreneurs and investors 
involved in the promotion of Europe's imperialistic enterprises overseas 
" Feinstcin(1997). 
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underestimated the expenditures and risks involved. Costs of conquest 
often turned out to be much greater than first anticipated. Prospects for 
loot and plunder promoted the venture and could produce immediate and 
sometimes large gains but the pacification and persistent coerción of native 
populations denuded the economic basis for long term exploitation of the 
natural resources, tradeable commodities and markets that Europeans 
hoped to tum into flows of material benefits for themselves, their societies 
and their power within the international order of competing states. 
Furthermore, and until very late in the day, European governments, 
merchants and businessmen failed to invest at anywhere near the levéis 
required in the infrastructural facilities and human capital formation in 
order to ensure that their supposed control of colonial populations, natural 
resources and under-exploited assets of África, Asia, and South America 
became really profitable. North America was another stor>' and the discovery 
but exploitation of that sub continent crowded out European investment 
elsewhere in the world economy. 
Meanwhile, and for two reasons, the costs of control (including coerción 
and the extensión of incentives designed to secute collaboration between 
the colonised and the colonisers) increased through time. Even among 
the more ruthless of imperial rulers, their capacity for control remained 
geographically, politically and economically constrained by the resources 
and instruments for coerción and exploitation at their disposal. When the 
technologies for stronger more p)ervasive govemment gradually improved, 
they faced growing resistance from nationalistic movements for colonial 
freedom which raised the costs of coerción within the empire and also 
at home within the metrópolis. 
Local resistance certainly mattered particularly when it carne to time 
to depart during the era of decolonisation and when the reluctance to 
leaving by some European governments inflicted a final round of heavy 
costs upon several metropolitan economies. Finally, throughout the five 
centuries or more of European expansión overseas, the context of great 
power politics within which imperialism occurred lead and contributed to 
rivalry, mercantilism and warfare, which is perhaps the major reason why 
the potential gains to Europe from overseas expansión, colonisation and 
trade were dissipated and at this end of the twentieth century look so 
disappointing. 
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